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CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT FUND
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Western Michigan University, 1973
The United Nations Capital Development Fund was established by
the U, N, General Assembly under Resolution 2168 (XXI) of 13 Decem
ber 1966,

Its expressed purpose was to assist developing countries

in the development of their economies by supplementing existing
sources of capital assistance by means of grants and loans, partic
ularly long-term loans made free of interest or at low interest rates c
More than its actual or potential role, the Fund has a symbolic
meaning for the developing nations.

To them, j_t represents the best

hope of overcoming their problem of capital shortage,

It symbolizes

also the expected role of the rich countries of the world in sharing
their wealth to alleviate poverty.
However, the Fund has failed to serve as a viable agency for
the provision of capital on a world wide scale,

Its failure can be

attributed to the absolute refusal of the developed nations to lend
financial support,

PREFACE
It is becoming increasingly evident that the existence together,
in an increasingly technological world, of highly developed and under
developed nations, is one of the critical problems of our time; and,
indeed, many other aspects of international relations are rapidly
becoming related to this central crux,

The problem of development of

the less developed countries, which now constitute a substantial
majority of the family of nations poses almost overwhelming odds
against them,

These countries are desperately short of the necessary

capital and the needed skills, and must look more and more to the out
side world for assistance,

It is in response to this plea for assist

ance that the United Nations has, through its Member States, estab
lished institutions and procedures for the granting of financial and
technical aid to the developing countries,
Yet it is painfully evident that present programs of aid are
totally inadequate,
realized,

Little progress has been and is today being

The volume of capital available to the developing countries

continues to fall short of their capital requirements.

While the

national incomes of the developed nations grow at rates of about 5 to
6 per cent a year, incomes of the developing nations grow at
cent a year,

J½

per

Though the rich nations are getting richer, economic

assistance has stayed on a plateau,

Therefore, in proportion to

national income, economic assistance has begun to fall and is still
falling,

The First Development Decade target set for the flow of
ii

iii
external capital to the developing nations was 1 per cent of the com
bined annual national incomes of the developed countries.

This goal

was farther from realization in 1964 than in 1961 when the target was
set.

The Economic and Socia] Council reports that during the period

1961-1964 there was a steady decline in percentage from about 0.83
per cent in 1961 to 0.65 per cent in 1964.

In 1970, net disbursements

of official development assistance from developed market economy
countries to developing countries and multilateral institutions
amounted to 0,37 per cent of the combined GNP of these nations.

Sub

sequent reports show no marked increase in this percentage.
The effectiveness of these inadequate resource flows has been
weakened by the shift in the composition of aid from grants to loans,
and the hardening of loan terms with regard to interest rates, matu
rities and grace periods,

These hard terms of capital assistance

have saddled many developing countries with heavy burdens of debt,
Estimates show that the outstanding external public debt of ninety
six developing countries increased from $10 billion to $39,2 billion
between 1956-1965, and payments of interest and amortization on this
debt increased by about 400 per cent from $0,8 billion to $3,5 billion
over the same period,

The urgency of the problem is revealed in

recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
projections which indicate that net lending to developing countries
will become negative after 1975 if the levels of grants and loans and
average terms and conditions remain unchanged,
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This study is concerned with one institution established by the
United Nations to deal directly with the problem of capital shortage
in the developing countries, i,e,, the United Nations Capital Devel
opment Fund,

Established by the United Nations General Assembly under

Resolution 2168 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the Fund was to supplement
existing sources of capital assistance "by means of grants and loans,
particularly long-term loans made free of interest or at low interst
rates,"

The Fund, however, has failed to function effectively in

this capacity,

More than its actual or potential role, the Fund idea,

during the long campaign to create it, took on symbolic meaning,

To

the poor countries, it was their best (and last) hope to overcome the
major obstacles to their modernization and achieve a great victory,
It symbolized also the expected role of the rich countries of the
world in sharing their wealth so that poverty and gross inequality
might be overcome,

Increasingly it became the ultimate solution, and

the poor countries tended to base their hope and measure their prog
ress on a scale related to support for and opposition to the Fund,
The ultimate political victory leading to its creation, followed by
the blatant defeat of the Fund as an effective operational program
by the refusal of the rich countries to underwrite its funding led to
the shattering of the symbolic illusion,

The developing states are

still trying to pick up the pieces of their shattered myth and build
a new approach to development, but the wound created by its shattering
continues to fester,

The idealism that helped to build the myth, how

ever, is being replaced by a new pragmatism that recognizes that the

V

rich and powerful nations define their own national interests and imple
ment them in their own way. There is a new recognition that voting
victories in international bodies cannot force the rich and powerful
stated to act contrary to the way in which they define their own
interests.
The purpose of this thesis is to try to explain this failure.

In

so doing it will be necessary, first of all, to discuss the whole
sphere of the financing of economic development within the United
Nations framework. Utilizing the literature on economic development,
I plan to analyze the critical role of capital in the development pro
I shall briefly examine other institutions established under

cess,

the aegis of the U. N. for the specific purpose of providing capital,
e.g., IBRD, IFC, and IDA.

I plan to analyze and evaluate the effec

tiveness of these agencies in meeting the demand for capital, and
relate these findings to the decision of the U. N. majority to create
a UNCDF.

Other possible or potential sources of developmental capital,

e,g., trade surpluses, will also be reviewed.
It will be necessary to analyze the philosophical and theoretical
perspectives of the rich and poor nations as regards methods for the
financing of economic development.

Indeed the failure of the UNCDF is

a manifestation of the great difference in perspectives of these t;.;o
blocs.

It is only against this background of conflicting perspectives

that one can begin to understand the different attitudes of nations
engaged in the UNCDF campaign.

I plan in particular to study these

perspectives and attitudes as reflected in the General Assembly debates

l
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on the UNCDF.

I intend also to study the decision making apparatus

of the UNCDF and planned method for the procurement of capital, both
of which serve as focal points of controversy,
To recapitulate in brief, I plan in this thesis to set forth the
facts that led to the creation of the UNCDF as the culmination of the
14-year SUNFED campaign by the developing states bloc in the United
Nations.

My investigation will concentrate in particular on explain

ing the reasons for the majority state victory in creating the UNCDF,
and the subse�uent economic failure of the new institution as a result
of the almost total lack of support by the capital-rich countries of
the world,

In my analysis, I plan to try to find answers to the latter

failure by looking at both objective facts and psychological and ideo
logical factors that have created different images of the role of cap
ital in the developmental process, and of the UNCDF role,

Out of these

analyses will emerge some conclusions that will help to explain the
reasons for UNCDF's failure and possibly postulate the base for a new
and more fruitful working relationship between the rich and poor states
in the drive to obtain capital,
In writing this thesis I have utilized primary source materials
such as the United Nations Official Documents and the Official Records
of the General Assembly debates, etc.

Journals such as the United

Nations Monthly Chronicle, International Conciliation, and International
Organization were used as well as books, articles, and related mate
rials which deal with the problem of financing economic development,
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INTRODUCTION
That poverty exists in the underdeveloped countries of the world
is an old story,
about it,

What is new is their determination to do something

People in these countries are convinced that the continua

tion of poverty, hunger and disease is not inevitable,

They are no

longer prepared to accept the hope of felicity in heaven as a substi
tute for happiness on earth,

With a growing unanimity they are deter

mined that something must be done about the widening gap between their
standard of living and that of the developed world,
The economic development of a country largely depends on its
financial resources,

In other words, a major factor for the develop

ment process is the accumulation of the necessary capitai.1

In the

advanced countries economic growth is maintained without notable diffi
culty by national saving and investing, whereas the inhabitants of the
underdeveloped countries are too poor to have any savings to invest,
Though many aid programs have been initiated to lift the economic level
of these poor countries, the volume of capital available to them con
tinues to fall short of their capital requirements,
It was in recognition of the fundamental problem of capital short
age in the poor nations and the problem of reconstruction of war-torn
Europe that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) was established in 1945,

Although it is stated in the Bank's

1Kirdar, Uner, The Structure of United Nations Economic Aid to
Underdeveloped Countries ('.rhe Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 97,
j_

2
Statutes that it.s resources and facilities should be used with eq_uitable
consideration to projects for development and projects for reconstruc
tion. alike, in practice during the formative years of the Bank, eq_ui
table consideration meant reconstruction first, then development,
During the first three years of its operation a total of $735,145
thousand was lent to member countries, of which $535,500 thousand went

for reconstruction purposes and $198,645 thousand for development,1

Throughout this period the lion's share of the Bank's lending went to
highly developed countries,
Thus the shortage of capital remained a barrier to the development
of the underdeveloped world,

Dissatisfied with the unfair allocation

of the Bank's resources, the developing nations looked to the United
Nations for leadership in their struggle to attain the means whereby
development could be financed,
The idea of a United Nations Capital Development Fund can be
traced to the third session of the Sub-Commission on Economic Develop
ment (March-April 1949),

The Sub-Commission's Chairman V, K, R, V, Rao

of India proposed, at that time, that a United Nations Economic Devel
opment Agency should be established,

Its primary function, he suggested,

would be to "finance or help to finance those schemes of economic devel
opment which could not be financed from the country's own resources
and for which loans could not be obtained on strict business princi
ples,,.2 During the third session of the General Assembly, (April-May
1
ibid.. p, 164,

2Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Ninth
Session, Supplement 11B, p. 22,

3

1949), the developing nations strongly criticized the policy of assist
ance granted by the Bank,

They contended that if assistance was to be

effective, the Bank would have to grant larger loans more liberally and
speedily,

They also suggested that the Bank explore the possibility of

financing more development plans for the advancement of their poor
nat.ions, 1

Following these discussions the General Assembly approved Resolu
tion 198 in which it recommended that the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) and the specialized agencies give urgent consideration to the
problem of economic development of the developing nations,

This reso

lution was considered during the eighth (February-March 1949) and ninth
(July-August 1949) sessions of the Council but no concrete proposal on
methods of financing economic development was set forth,

Although

some members expressed the desire to set up a new international body,
the Council rejected this proposal by 10 votes to 6 with

2

abstentions2

as a result of the initiative of the United States representative,
At its eleventh session (July-September 1950), the Council was
again faced with the Rao proposal for a development agency,

While

agreeing that much essential development of a '' social overhead" nature
could not be financed by the Bank, the representatives of the United
States and the United Kingdom opposed any modification of the Bank's
constitution,

They suggested that a "favorable climate" to develop an

international �arket for capital could be established if the developing
1

General Assembly Official Records, Second Committee, Third
Session, pp. 38-39,
20fficial Records of ECOSOC, Ninth Session, pp. 872, 877,
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nations improved their legislation and administrative machinery and
guaranteed the loans made by foreign private sources,

EC0S0C Resolu

tion 290 1 subsequently adopted by the Council was heavily weighted in
favor of the developed countries,

It contained a generous amount of

advice for the developing nations but no practical solution.
also the position of the fifth General Assembly,

This was

It limited itself to

the adoption of Resolution 400 by which it recommended that the EC0S0C
should "consider practicaJ methods, conditions and policies for achiev
ing the adequate expansion and steadier flow of foreign capital " to
underdeveloped countries and "pay attention to the financing of non
self-liquidating projects which are basic to development,11 2
A group of experts, appointed by the Secretary-General in accord
ance with the EC0SOC Resolution 290, prepared a unanimous report
entitled "Measures for Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries,113
The report contained sixteen major recommendations of which the four
teenth and sixteenth related most directly to the capital needs of the
developing states:
Recommendation 14: The United Nations should establish
an international development authority to assist the under
developed countries in preparing, co-ordinating and imple
menting their programmes of economic development; to distrib
ute to underdeveloped countries grants in aid for specific
purposes; to verify the proper utilization of such grants;
and to study and report on the progress of development pro
grammes,
1

EC0SOC Resolution 290 (XI),September

2

1 5,

1950,

General Assembly Resolution 400 (V) , November

2 0, 1 950,

JECOSOC, official documents, "Measures for Economic Development of
Underdeveloped Countries," Doc, E/1986,
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Recommendation 16: The United Nations should explore
the possibility of establishing an international finance
corporation to make equity investments and to lend to pri
vate undertakings operating in underdeveloped countries,
These recommendations were considered at the thirteenth session
of the ECOSOC (August-September 1951). While all representatives
agreed that there was a need for external grant assistance to the
developing nations, there was disagreement on the type of machinery
through which grants would be made available and on whether the crea
tion of such an international machinery was currently feasible and
practical,

The representatives of some developing nations, i.e.,

Chile, Philippines and India, advocated the establishment of such an
agency,2 The United States delegate stressed that "lack of means

would not permit a number of countries to participate in this venture,
Moreover, the underdeveloped countries, as a result of their improved
balance of payments position, would be able to meet to a greater
extent their development requirements out of foreign exchange earn
ings,"3

The representative of the Soviet Union objected to the fact

that the experts had made no mention of establishment of national
industry, and they had advocated foreign capital as the primary means
of development and had thereby sought to encourage monopolistic exploi
tation.4

Without accepting or rejecting these recommendations the

1ibid,, p. 95,

2Yearbook of the United Nations
Press, 1951), p. 383 •
3·b·d
l l

4

,,

p, 382.

·b·d
l l ,, p. 383,

(New York:

Columbia University
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Council noted that the capital-exporting countries were not in a posi
tion to make any contribution to an international agency along the
lines suggested,

However, it requested the Secretary-General to

"formulate a series of methods which he deemed practicable for dealing
with the problem of grant assistance,111
The SUNFED Proposal
In January, 1952, the sixth General Assembly approved Resolution
520A by which it gave strong support to the idea of establishing a
special fund for grants in aid,

It requested the Council to submit a

detailed plan for establishing, as soon as circumstances permitted, a
Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) to pro
vide low interest, long-term loans to developing countries for the
purpose of helping them, at their request, to accelerate their devel
opment and to finance non-self-liquidating projects,2

By this resolu

tion (hereafter referred to as the SUNFED Proposal) the Assembly
stressed its belief that the national incomes of the developing coun
tries did not allow a sufficient accumulation of domestic savings to
provide heavy investments for rapid development.

It also expressed

the belief that there existed an urgent necessity of creating new
sources of international financing,

Though Resolution 520A was a mild

victory for the developing nations, it was obvious to all that without
the participation and the contributions of the capital-rich countries,
1ECOSOC Resolution 368 (XIII), August 27, 1951,

2
General Assembly Resolution 520A (VI), January 12, 1952,
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the establishment and the adeq_uate operation of such a fund was a
ut,opian dream,
The Secretary-General submitted to members of the Council in May
1 952,

a working paper 1 setting forth a scffies of "alternative approaches"

for establisl1ing a special fund for economic development,

It dealt

with the resources of such a fund, the ways in whi.ch they might be
made available to countries needing th:cm, and the machinery req_uired
to supervise operations,

Both in the meetings of the fourteenth ses

sion of the ECOSOC and the seventh session of the General Assembly
(October-December

1 952),

representatives of the developed nations

indicated that their e;overnments w·ould not be able to contribute at
present to such an agency and noted that subscriptions to such a fund
mie;ht well reduce the existing financiaJ. assistance to the developing
countrfos,

On their initiative the Council as well as the Assembly

decided that the study of the many aspects of the proposed fund was
not sufficiently completed and therefore requested the Secretary
General to continue his study,

In addition, the Council established

a nommittee of nine persons to work in conjunction with the Secretary-

General, 2

1 ECOSOC,

official documents, "Methods of Financing Economic
Development," Doc, E/2234,
2ECOSOC Resolutions 416A and 416C, May 27, 1952,
Assembly Resolution 622 (VII), November 6, 1952,

General

8

The Committee of Nine
The committee of nine met from 21 January to 6 March 1953.

It

subseq_uently submitted a :r.-eport 1 containing a series of recommendations.
Because this report formed the basis of discussion in subseq_uent years
and because it contained those principles upon which the Capital Devel
opment Fund was ultimately establj_shed, some of its recommendations
are herewith summarized:
1.

Resources of the fund should be made up of voluntary
annual contributions rather tha.n of capital subscrip
tions, the Fund should be authorized to accept and
appeal for contributions from non-governmental agencies,
and contributions of each government should be deter
mined according to its economic strength and resources,2

2.

Contributions to the Fund should be convertible to
other currencies if tbe contributing government per
mits such conversion.5

J.

The minimum initial figure for the establishment of
the Fund is 250 million, and these funds shoula be
replenished at "regular periodic conferences,"

4.

Certaln principles and policies should be observed and
accepted by members -::>f the Fund, a) The Fund should
not serve as a means for foreign economic and political
interference in the internal affairs of assisted coun
tries; b) it should not be influenced by considerations
relating to the political structure of the country
req_uesting assistance; and c) it should support proj
ects with the widest possible impact on the whole
economy rather than be limited to non-self-liq_uidating
projects.S

1EC0S0C, official documents, "Report on a Special United Nations
J:t,und for Economic Development," Doc. E/2381.
2·b·d
l l ,
12.
1

::;ip.

9,

Ji"'.)id,, p. 13.
4·b·d
l l , , p. 15.

5.b.d
l l ., pp. 20, 21.

9

s.

The merits of individual applications, the mainte
nance of a reasonable geographical distribution and
possible results of each project should be considered
in the allocation of the Fund's resources,1

6.

Loans should not be made according to strict commercial
principles. In providing grants and loans the intF,rest
of the receiver should be "the paramount consideration,"2

9,

Membership in the Fund should be open to members of
the United Nations or any specialized agency willine
to subscribe to its principles and policies,3

10.

The Fund should be controlled and managed by a General
Council composed of representatives of all members,
3.,11 Executive Board composed of representatives of eight
to twelve members-representation being eq_ually dis
tributed behreen major contributors and the developing
na+,ions, and a Di:r,ector General functioning as chair
man of the Board, 4·

11.

The Fund should be esta;Jlishecl as a separate adminis
tration with an independent bud.get,5

12,

No mechanism of weighted voting should operate in the
Executive Board, All effort should be made to achieve
unanimous agreement; however, if division should oc ur,
g
decision should be taken by a simple majority vote,

These recommendations were considered at the sixteenth ::,ession
of the Council.

There was no deviation from tne line of policy fol

lowed by the capital-rich nations,

On the contrary, a new barrier

for retarding progress toward the realization of the Fund was intro
duced by the United States whose representative stated:
1ii,,
·b·d
p. 26.
2 ·t ·
iid,, p. 28,
3·t·
i id

I'

4
·b
·d ,
i
i

1

p. J4.
p. 35,

· i. d,, pp.
Sib

6·ib
"d ,
i

1

,1 :>,

✓

36.

pp. 40, 41.
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Substar..tial though United States Assistance for economic
development had been, its scale had beGn limited by cir
cumstances over which it had. no control. Aggression and
the threat of aggression had called for the assumption,
most reluctantly accepted, of a heavy burden of armament.
The United States government was ready to ask its people
to join with all nations in devoting a substantial per
centage of the savings which would be achieved by such
disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction,1
The United States subsequently introduced a draft resolution 2 endorsed
by other major potential contributors, in which they pledged to ask their
peoples, when genuine progress had been made toward internationally
supervised world-wide disarmament, to devote a portion of the savings
achieved th.rough such disarmament to an international fund for develop
ment and reconstruction.

In essence, the developed nations were of

the opinion that further refinement of a scheme such as that proposed
by the Committee of Nine would be premature in the absence of circum
stances conducive to its realization, Le., the absence of security.
The significance of the U. S, proposal was that the SUNFED Proposal
would be shelved almost for good, despite the belief in its necessity,
In the light of the deep ideological differences between east and west,
peace seemed unattainable,

Thus, representatives of the developing

nations opposed the idea of tying the Fund too closely to the savings
which it was hoped would be derived from disarmament,

In their view,

the needs of their impoverished countries required immediate attention,
SUNFED had been regarded as an important solution to their. problem.

p.

1ECOSOC, Sixteenth Session, Summary Records, official documents,

139.
2

ECOSOC, official documents, Doc, E/1,

536, July 14, 1953,

To
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make its establishment depended upon disarmament was to give economic
development a lower priority than rearmament,

In the words of the

delegate from Argentina,
It was as necessary to free the world from hunger,
lllness. , , as it was to lay the foundation of col
lective security and it was inconceivable that present
peact should be purchased at the price of·future hun
ger,
They urged that the report be used as a basis for the consideration of
further preparatory steps for the establishment of the Fund,
The SUNFED Campaign
The eighth General Assembly (15 September-9 December 1953)
reviewed the report of the Committee of Nine and req_uested Member
States to submit their detailed comments,

In addition, it appointed

a committee to examine the comments received, to collate them and to
report to the Council and the Assembly,

A comprehensive report2was

submitted at the Assembly's ninth session (October-December 1954),

In

general, the report reflected no change in the attitude of the capital
rich countries,

It concluded that the essential conditions for the

establishment of SUNFED did not exist at that time,

It explained that

this was because of the slowness in achieving disarmament and of the
continued disinclination of major industrial powers to lend support to
1

ECOSOC, Sixteenth Session, ibid,, p. 161,

2General Assembly, official recorrls, Ninth Session, Supplement
19 (A/2728).
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its establishment,

It noted that several industrial nations had crit

icized the voting procedures recommended by the committee,
Progress toward the establishment of the Fund was further delayed
when the United States and other Western nations pledged their support
for the establishment of an International Finance Corporation,

The

idea of such a Corporation had been suggested in the report entitled
"Mea.sures for Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries111 submitted to the Council's thirteenth session,

It had, at that time,

been rejected by the United States and other industrial powers,

The

sudden shift in U, S, policy was the result of many fac-1:,ors amongst
which was the increasing aggressiveness of the developing nations in
their car.ipaign for the establishment of the SUNFED,

More importantly,

the Corporation was viewed as an alternative to the SUN.F'ED which would
be more compatible with the United States national interest considera
tions,

If it was necessary to make a choice between the two proposed

organizations, it was the Corporation which should be endorsed and
SU�FED postponed,

Because, in addition to the fact that the IFC

involved a relatively modest contribution, it would mobilize only pri
vate capital, encourage private enterprise and represent a more con
trollable instrument from the standpoint of United States policy,
Indeed, U, S, participation in the proposed Corporation was subject to
its establishment as an affiliate of the IBRD and to the limitation of
its membership to the members of the Bank, 2

The calculation of the

1ECOSOC, official documents, Doc, E/1')86,
2Kirdar, pp, 173, 174,

13

United States was correct; the IFC was subsequently established and
SUNFED again delayed during 1 955, The position of the industrialized
nations of the east had shifted at this time from one of opposition to
the FUND to one of support,

They severely criticized Western bilateral

aid and gave ostensible support for the principle that all kinds of
assistance should be gTanted under the aegis of the United Nations,
Contrary to the expectation of the capital-rich nations of the
west, the establishment of the IF'C did not quench the desire of the
developing nations for a special fund for economic development,

Dur

ing the years following the creation of the Corporation the same argu
ments for SUNFED were repeated in the United Nations forum by the same
group of countries which were even more convinced of the correctness
of their thesis and more determined to run a successful campaign,
The eleventh General Assembly (November 1956-February 1957)
entertained. many proposals set forth by Member States as alternatives
to the SUNFED,

The representative from France presented a plan1 for

the reorganization of assistance given under the auspices of the
United Nations,

In the same vein the representative of Argentina

recommended the establishment of a Special Fund to "finance regional
centers for surveying natural resources and regional technological
institutions for training technicians and studying methods of increas
ing productivity in the developing nations,2

Even these proposals

were rejected by the United States and the United Kingdom who pre
sented the following arguments:
1

General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Second Committee, Summary
Records, 403rd meeting, p. 1 50,
2ibid,, p, 169,
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1.

If the Fund were to be established forthwith, it
would only be set up on a minute scale that would
be ineffective, lead to disillusionment and damage
the prestige of the United Nations,

2.

Until a substantial amount of additio.::ial resources
could be released by disarmament, no meaningful
fund could be established without increasing infla
tionary pressures,

J.

Private internatio.::ial capital inv stments had
l
recently been increasing rapidly,

The ::=;upporters of SUNFED came to the twelfth General Assembly
(September-November 1957) prepared to continue their campaign, When
the question of SUNFED :;ame up for discussion, the Second Committee
was presented with an eleven-Power (Argentina, Ceylon, Chile, Egypt,
Greece, India, Indonesia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Venezuela and
Yugoslavia) draft resolution2 by which it would be decided to establisb an "Economic Development Fund,"

The resolution envisaged that

the fund would begin its operations by 1 January 1960 "at the latest."
In addition, the Committee had before it a draft resolution 3 by the
United States by which the Assembly would establish a "Special Proj
ects Fund" (Special Fund) within the Expanded Programme of Technical
Assistance to pr0vide "systematic and sustained assistance in fields
e�:;sential to the integrated technical, economic and social development
of the developing nations.

The Special Fund was a belated recognition

by the advanced states that technical assistance is only meaningful as
1ECOSOC, Official Records, Twenty-Fourth Session, :p. 191.

2

General Assembly, Official Records, Doc. A/C,2/L,3J1 and Rev, 1.

3General Asse;nbly, Official Records, Doc, A/C,2,IL. 3 54.
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a development tool if matched by inputs of capital. At that, it was
only a compromise falling far short of the perennial demands of the
developing states for the creation of a massive capital development

fund to provide capital grants and loans.1

The new United States proposal brought about a reasonable relaxa
tion in the tension existing between the divergent groups.

A majority

of member States now believed that it would be undesirable to establish
SUNFED without adeq_uate resources and that it would be better to have
the Special Fund proposed by the United States tha� to postpone all
action.

It was clear to the representatives of the developing nations

that if the committee rejected the U, S, proposal and insisted only on
the creation of SUNFED, that Fund would not receive contributions from
the United States and without dollars there could be no SUNFED,

Though

they endorsed the American proposal, they did not hesitate to bring to
the General Assembly another draft resolution envisaging the continua
tion of the campaign for a capital development fund and recommending
the inclusion on the agendas of subseq_uent sessions of the General
Assembly "the q_"c1estion of the establishment of the Capital Development

Fund as a separate item,112

During discussions of the preparatory measures for the Special
Fund, a number of references were made to the possibility of transform
ing this fund into a capital development fund at a later date,

The

1Plano, Jack C, and Robert E. Riggs, Forging World Order: The
Politics of International Organization, (New York: The Macmillan Com
pany, 1967?, pp. 445, 446.
2

General Assembly, official documents, Doc, A/C,2/L.386,
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United States representative read:Uy dispelled this notion.

He

announced that his government was studying the possibility of the cre
ation of an International Development Association as an affiliate of

the Bank,1

The IDA was to start with a capital four times that which

had been recommended for the Capital Developme::i._t Fund.

It was to

finance projects of the type recommended by the Committee of Nine on
terms more favorable than those of the Bank.

In effect, the IDA Pro

posal was the third attempt by the western nations to provide a sub
stitute for SUNFED.

Its affiliation with the Bank would ensure that

western dominance was maintained through the weighted voting system.
As Gardner2 states:
The United States and most other aid-giving countries of
the free world preferred to use the IDA for the transfer
of public capital on liberal credit terms rather than a
capital development fund, not merely because the weighted
voting system applied, but also because the experienced
management of the Bank would be available to assure the
efficient use of IDA resources.
By Resolution 1420 (December 5, 1959) the fourteenth General Assembly
supported the establishment of IDA and expressed the belief that the
new agency would provide the d.eveloping countries with types of finan
cing which had not hitherto been available.

IDA d.uly began its opera

tion on November 8, :1.960,
In the establishment of the IDA, the o.eveloping nations found new
evidence of the determination of the capital-rich world to thwart all
efforts toward the realization of a capital development fund along the
1General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Summary Record.s, p. 60.
2

Gardner, Richa-r.d, In Pursuit of World Order,(New York:
Publishers, 196 5), p, 121.

Praeger
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lines proposed,

In its establishment they also found renewed strength

to continue their fight.

In their view, neither the IDA nor the Special

Fund could serve as a substitute for UNCDF.

These agencies had not met

the q_ualifications and provisions set forth for the proposed 1',und, As
the representative of India explained:
IDA was not regarded by the developing nations as a
suitable alternative to a United Nations Capital Devel
opment Fund: it did not have the necessary universality
an d its method of voting was weighted, It reflected the
philosophy only of those powers which had the majority,
The developing nations wanted a financial organization in
which they had an effective voice, They preferred a
multilateral fund which ensured that recipient nations
could obtain aid without loss of �ignity and sovereignty
and without political conditions,
Other representatives from developing nations were of the opinion that
the unwillingness of the developing nations to channel their assistance
through the United Nations was the prime reason for their opposition
to SUNFED,

2

At the fifteenth General Assembly (October-December 1960), the
ba-�tle over the UNCDF which pitted the numerical strength of the devel
oping nations against the unyielding determination of the industrial
ones continued to be waged from positions which had become well
entrenched over the years,

Although many sophisticated arguments and

accusations were fired back and forth, the explanation for the lack of
concrete action was to be found in the existence of an unbridgeable
1
General Assembly, official records, Fourteenth Session, Second
Conrnittee, Summary records, p, 126.
2ibid,, p, 129,

gap between the two sides' views.1
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As long as both groups insisted on

having predominant influence in the organization providing development
capital, a compromise seemed unlikely,

Despite the opposition of the

main donor members, the developing nations scored at least a diplomatic
victory when the Assembly with a::1 overpowering majority of

71 to 4

with 10 abstentions, decided "in principle" that a United Nations Cap-

ital Development Fund should be established,2

It also requested a

committee of 25 representatives of Member States, designated by the
Assembly, to co::1.sider preparatory measures, including draft legislation,
necessary for the establishment of the Fund,
Coi11Illittee on UNCDF
The committee was established in accordance with the Assembly's
resolution and concluded a series of meetings between May 15 - June 5,
1961.

During these meetings it drafted twelve general principles which

should be taken into account for the establishment of the Fund,

How-

ever, the committee was unable to prepare the Statute for the proposed
fund and therefore recommended that the General Assembly extend its ma:"1date,

Here, again, the representatives of the four economically advanced

countries in the committee (United States, United Kingdom, France and
Canada) voted against this resolution.3

Nevertheless, the sixteenth

1rnternational Conciliation, No, 5 1+, September 1961, p. 141-1-,
3
2General Assembly Resolution 1521 (XV), December 15, 1960,

311Twelve Principles Proposed for Capital Development Fund," United.
Nations Review, Vol. 8, No, 8, 1961, pp. 22, 27.
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General Assembly by resolution 1706 extended the mandate of the com
mittee urging it to prepare the necessary draft legislation for a UNCDF
and submit the draft statute to its seventeenth session,
Unwillingness of the capital-rich nations to become associated
with any new United Nations machinery in this field was strongly dram
atized in the spring of 1962 when seven delegations representing
Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and.
the United States refused to participate in preparing a draft statute
for the Fund,1 These delegations pointed out that, in view of their
inability to support the establishment of the Fund it would not be
appropriate for them to participate in the committee's consideration
of the statute,

They maintained that IDA had filled the void which

might have existed in the field of capital assistance and that efforts
should be geared tov-1ard the full utilization of existing financial
agenc-Les.

The creation of a new agency, they contended, would only

serve to duplicate existing machinery and complicate the task of coordi
nation between the many agencies of the United. Nations,

As the United

States representative saw it:
The principal [ sic J obstacle to economic growth in ma�--iy
less developed countries was no longer the lack of exter
nal financing, but rather the absence of the trained
people, the public and private institutions, and the
values �hich are essential for a successful development
effort,
1ECOSOC, official documents, Report of the Committee on UNCDF
Doc, E/3654,

2General Assembly, official records, Draft report of Committee on
UNCDF, Doc, A/AC,102/L,1/Rev, 1, p, 54,
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1
Nevertheless, the committee drafted the statute of the Fund.
The General Assembly examined the draft statute at its seventeenth
session (September-December

1963) and re�uested the Secretary-General

to obtain comments and observations of Member States,

The idea of the

transformation of the Special Fund or IDA into a capital development
fund was again set forth by some Scandinavian countries.
to this proposal the

u.

In objecting

S. representative brought to the Assembly's

attention the fact that the Special Fund had not met its initial tar
get and that it stood in need of more resources to fulfill its mandate
in the field of pre-investment.

As regards the IDA, he stated, "its

present organization had won full confidence of taxpayers in the United
States and other major contributor countries.

Any basic changes might

well jeopardize its support,11 2
Creation of UNCDF
Undaunted by the continued opposition of thP- main donor countries
the Assembly majority in Resolution

1936 (December 11, 1963) asked the

Secretary-General to study the possibility of transformin� the Special
F'und into a UNCDF and submit his report to the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in

1964.

In the light of the Secre-

tariat study the aforementioned conference approved two separate
1ibid,, Doc. E/3654.
pp.

2
United State Department of State Bulletin, No,

561-563,

49, October 7, 1963,
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recommendations1 on this question,

It recommended that governments

participating in the conference take a construstive attitude toward a
gradual transformation of the Special Fund,

It also suggested that the

UNCDF should start its operations at an early date to finance on favor
able terms, in all developing countries, national and regional devel
opment plans, programmes and projects,
This item was discussed at the twentieth General Assembly (Octo
ber-December

1 965)

ber 8, 1965),

wh1ch subsequently adopted Resolution

2 042

(Decem

By this it reaffirmed the need to extend United Nations

economic assistance to the field of investment a�d it urged the
economically advanced. countries to undertake measures designed to
ensure the beginning of the operations of a UNCDF at an early date,
But, the capital-rich nations were not moved by this plea, As Gardner2
states:
The United States opposed the creation of a capital
development fund by the Assembly, precisely because large
amounts of capital aid 1rnuld be disbursed under circum
stances that would not assure the promotion of United
States foreign-policy objectives, It is not merely that
large amounts of aid might be given to communist coun
tries; it is also that the standards essential to the
successful application of external aid would not be likely
to be maintained,
After more than a decade of persistent effort, the United Nations
Capital Development was established by Resolution 21 86 of the twenty
first General Assembly, (December 13, 1966),

Its expressed purpose

was "to assist developing countries in the development of their
1United Nations Documents, Final Act of UNCTAD, 1964, Doc,
E/CONF,46/1 39, Recommendations A,IV,7 and A,IV,8,
2

Gardner, pp.

1 20,

121 ,

22
economies by supplementing existing sources of capital assistance by
means of grants and loans, particularly long-term loans made free of
interest or at low interest rates,111

Its principles and guidelines

for policy were generally similar to those set forth by the Committee
of Nine,

In its establishment the Assembly majority had indeed scored

a political victory,
won.

But they realized that the battle was only half

They had fought unrelentingly against many odds and even now

that the fund had been established, the support of the capital-rich
world was not forthcoming,

Let me now examine those conditions which

so convinced the developing nations of the correctness of their cause
and the necessity for a capital development fund,

1International Conciliation, September 1967, p, 131,

CHAPTER II
WHY A CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT FUND?
The reasons why the underdeveloped countries of the United
Nations campaigned so resolutely for the creation of a Capital Devel
opment Fund are complex but compelling,
out:

Two motivating factors stand

a) a belief that capital shortage is the major obstacle to the

development of their economies; and b) a dissatisfaction with pre
existing institutions set up to alleviate the capital shortage,
Though the incidence of "characteristics" usually attributed to under-

"' ,.

developed economies is not uniform among all such countries, all underdeveloped economies have in common certain problems,

Relative scarcity

of capital is probably the most common shared characteristic,

Thus,

any discussion of the reasons for a capital development fund must
begin with an analysis of the role of capital in the development process,
The Role of Capital
In the literature of economic development one of the most impor
tac1.t debates taking place is the one dealing with the greater or lesser
importance of capital as a factor in the development process,

Tradi

tionally, to economists the term, ca1iital, has meant factories, machine
tools, buildings and other types of reproducible production equipment,1

1Tangri, Shanti S, and H, Peter Gray (eds,), Capital Accumulation
and Economic Development_ (D, C, Heath Company, Boston, 1967� p. 5,
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In studies of economic development, the importance of other types of
inputs to the process of production, almost taken for granted in
richer nations, has required economists to broaden the scope of their
concept of capital.

Plant, equipment and inventories in industry and

agriculture need little explanation; they comprise the traditional
concept.

Social overhead capital consists of transport facilities,

communications networks, public utilities, buildings of government
and the equipment necessary for the provision of public services,1
The acquired skills of the population-human capital-are also recog
nized as being productive and as necessary for the full utilization of
up-to-date plant and equipment,

Finally, the word capital also refers

to the pecuniary aspect of economic life,

So we may refer to physical

capita], financial capital and human capital.

All of these factors are

incorporated in the concept of capital and they all play a part in the
development process.

For, it is the absence of physical and human

capital, and the incapacity to produce them that defines the many
deficiencies of the underdeveloped nations.2

A significant segment of scholars in the field of economic devel
opment agrees that the problem of capital growth is one of the impor
tant keys to making a breakthrough in the process of development.
1ibid,, p. 7.
2Junker, Louis J,, "Capital Accumulation, Savings-Centered Theory
and Economic Development," Paper presented to the Association for
Evolutionary Economics, San Francisco, December 28, 1966, p, 26.
Mimeographed,
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According to Cairncross,1 the contribution of capital to economic
progress is not confined to the usufruct of additional capital assets,
similar to those already in existence,
processes,

It involves three distinct

First, a greater abundance of capital permits the intro

duction of better methods of production, e,g., freer use of capital
instruments, the use of more durable instruments and a change in the
pattern of consumption in favor of goods and services with relatively
high capital charges per unit cost,

Secondly, capital accumulation

provides for the widening of the structure of production,

It may

accompany an extension of the market associated with population growth,
more favorable terms of trade, or the discovery of additional resources,
Thirdly, capital is req_uired to allow technical progress to occur,
It may either finance the discovery of what was not known before, or
more commonly, the adaptation of existing knowledge so as to allow its
commercial exploitation through some innovation in product, process or
material.
While agreeing that capital is important in development, some
economists believe that its role has been overemphasized,

To them, it

is not as crucial and strategic to the development process as postulated
in much of the literature on economic development, They contend that
many other elements may be as important as-or even more important than1Cairncross, A, K., "The Place of Capital in Economic Progress,"
in Gerald Meier (ed,), Leadin Issues in Economic Develo ment (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970 , p, 181.

2

capital and their concurrent emphasis is necessary,

6

Professor Gal

braith 1 clearly expresses this view when he states:
Economists have said that capital and technical knowledge
are the missing elements in the development of the under
developed nations , • • • Even the most preliminary view
of the problem of development shows that effective govern
ment, education and social justice emerge as critically
important, Government in many of the new states are just
in the beginning stages, They operate at a very low level
of efficiency . , , • The primary task becomes one of
building competent organs of public administration, Where
these are weak or indifferent, trained technicians and
agricultural scientists are not of much use,
In expressing a similar viewpoint Pepelasis2 contends that in the
nineteenth-century industrialization of societies in which other con
ditions were favorable, development was not hindered by shortage of
capital, either in physical or financial terms,

He maintains that the

shortage of capital did not seem to prevent entrepreneurs from under
taking a large number of attractive projects.

Although he realizes

that in many respects contemporary underdeveloped countries are difer
ent from those of the nineteenth century, he nevertheless concludes
that the problem is often one of organization, of training managements
and men, and of creating new attitudes towards industrial employment
quite as much as of capital creation,

It is worth noting that similar

arguments were put forth by delegates from the developed nations during
the debate on the Fund,

In stating his country's opposition to the

1

Galbraith, Kenneth, Economic Development in Perspective (Cambridge:
Harvard Press, 1962), p. 6,
2

Pepelasis, Adamantios, Economic Develo ment: Anal V sis and Case
Studies (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 19 1 , pp. 9, 97,

27
Fund, the U, S, delegate on the UNCDF Committee maintained that the
principal obstacle to economic growth in many less developed countries
was no longer the lack of external financing, but rather the absence
of the trained people, the public and private institutions, and the
values which are essential for a successful development effort,1

The underdeveloped nations on the other hand attach great impor
tance to capital as a necessary and basic element in the process of
economic development,

This emphasis on capital does not suggest that

it is the sole requirement of development,

As a United Nations study2

states:
It would be an oversimplification to regard economic
development as a matter of capital accumulation alone.
Other factors are needed in addition, such as entrepre
neurship and training of workers, and public administra
tors, Yet, these are seldom possible without some
increase in the stock of capital, Therefore, capital
accumulation may well be regarded as the core process
by which other aspects of growth are made possible,
The provision of capital involves the availability not only of
financial resources but also of capital goods for new investment,

The

new technology to be applied in increasing production for raising
standards of living must embody itself in durable capital goods and
other producers' goods to be utilized in the productive process)
is impossible to separate capital from technology,

It

They are basic

1united Nations Doc, A/AC,10 2/1.1/Rev. 1, p. 54,
2

United Nations, "Capital Accumulation:
Tangri and Gray (eds,), p, 2 5,

The Core Process," in

3Hoselitz, Bert F,, The Progress of Underdeveloped Area:s (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p, 78,
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elements which should be applied jointly in the process of production.
If economic development is identified with an increase in productivity
and per capita output then the plea for capital is a plea not only for
an increase in the stock of equipment but a transfer of modern tech
nology, e.g., most efficient methods, tools and skills from the developed
to the underdeveloped world.

Physical capital and its trained agents

are indeed the basic elements in the development process.

For, the

character of productivity is necessarily limited by the available tech
nical means at hand or, at most, by logical extensions of those exist
ing techniques,1

In the developing countries, domestic productivity

with domestic tectmology is not sufficient to lead to any significant
growth, for it means more of the same kinds of limited tools.
Capital as a pecuniary variable, cannot dynamically cause techno
logical advancement.2

It can however allow technological advancement

to proceed by providing the means whereby efficient methods, tools and
skills can be acquired by the less developed nations,
cises some control over the technological process,

Thus, it exer

If the whole cate

gory of grants, loans and gifts can be viewed as an access system by
which the possible transfer of technique from the developed to the
underdeveloped world can take place, such things as the terms of loans,
the political character of the loaning and giving process, the private
investment and trade patterns, etc., all reflect the flexibility or
inflexibility of this system.
1Junker, p. JS.
2·b·d
l l ,

,

p.

35,
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In the view of the underdeveloped nations, a Capital Development
Fund making grants and soft loans could provide the means whereby tech
nological innovations could be introduced and developmental projects
launched,

But the developed world, bent on protecting its own interests,

has continuously vetoed this proposal.

As Junker puts it:

The technologically dominant world can determine, in no
small part foi· the technologically backward nations their
accessibility to tools, techniques and sustenance of all
kinds, The advanced nation can exert pavJerful influence
in determining the rise or fall of the means for making
international claims, in determining which international
claims will be honored, which wars of liberation are per
missible, which domestic oligarchies shall retain power
and which shall be overthrown and by what replacements,
and which domestic reforms will be tolerated, All this
points to the fact that capital accumulation is never just
a matter of tools and skills; it is also a function of the
exercise of power which defines the accessibility of the
means of life to those who so desperately need them.1
Thus the level of technology ultimately determines which countries have
political power; and the state of technology combined with the state
of political power determines who is the debtor and who is the creditor
among nations, 2
The Shortage
There is no general and objective way to determine the appropriate
amount of capital that should be transferred from rich to poor countries.
There have been in recent years a number of estimates of underdeveloped
1·b·d
l l ,,

p. 39,

2Gordon, Wendell C., "Foreign Investments," University of Houston
Business Review (Fall, 1962), p. 18.

30
countries' capital "requirements."1
ital shortage arises.

In each case the problem of cap

Thus, in spite of the lack of reliable data

concerning capital resources throughout the world, the scarcity of these
resources in underdeveloped countries is accepted by all sides.

Sta

tistics measuring such things as the electrical energy per capita, and
tractors per head may be only rough indicators of real capital shortage
in the developing countries.

As such, they have but limited value,

In

the first place, national statistical techniques often vary consider
ably and are not equally reliable or always consistent,

Difficulties

in measurement may lead to the underestimation of the amount of capital
and the rate of formation in certain sectors of underdeveloped econo
mies,

Nevertheless, even after allowance is made for these omissions,

the over-all picture still remains one of capital shortage for developing countries,
The dilemma of the underdeveloped countries can be put quite
simply.

Higher standards of living (if they are not to be achieved

through subsidies from the rest of the world) can be achieved only by
the development and more efficient utilization of productive resources.
Resources can be developed only by investment and investment demands
saving.

2

Income is the primary source of savings and where income per

1Rosenstein-Rodan, P, N., "International Aid for Underdeveloped
Countries," Review of Economics and Statistics, No, 43 (May 1961), pp.
107-138; U, N. World Economic Survey 1962, New York,1963; U, N. "Report
on the Capital Needs of Less Developed Countries 1964," Doc, A/AC.102/5;
UNCTAD,"Financial Resources for Development, Economic Growth and Devel
opment Financing: Issues, Policies and Proposals," April 1972, Doc,
TD/118.
2

Black, Eugene, "Can the U,D.C,•s Catch Up?" Journal of International Affairs, Vol, 16, No, 2, 1962, p. 193,
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capita is low, the annual rate of voluntary saving per capita will
also tend to be low.
Underdeveloped countries suffer from the difficulty that real
incomes per person-far from increasing at uneven rates-scarcely
improve at all.

Instead, they remain at the level of poverty.1

The

great mass of the people receive incomes which suffice only to buy the
bare necessities of life, with no margin for saving.

Only a very

small group in upper classes are potential savers and hence potential
investors in projects for development.

However, even among the small

groups of comparatively wealthy individuals, there is the tendency to
maintain their social position in part by what Thorstein Veblen called
"conspicuous consumption," which involves spending on current living
expenses virtually everything they receive in income.2

When they

invest, it is often in the more stable economies of the industrialist
states,

Thus domestic accumulation of capital in the poor countries

is bound to be slow,
To recapitulate, economic development requires and depends on
inputs of capital.

If such is to be accumulated so as to lead to

increased output and productivity, resources must be saved and invested
(allocated to the production of plant and equipment).

The source of

voluntary saving is intricately bound up in social attitudes towards
1Buchanan, Norman S, and Howard S. Ellis, Approaches to Economic
Development (Philadelphia: William F, Fell Company, 1955), p. 51,

2Alexander, Robert J., A Primer of Economic Development (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1962), pp, 87, 88,

economic mobility, and the level of income.1
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For low-income economies

operating at the level of subsistence and faced with the problem of an
ever-increasing population, a very large proportion of resources is
If a

used for consumption, leaving only a small margin for saving.

society already operative at starvation levels tries to refrain from
consuming a portion of its meager allowances, its capacity to produce
goods may diminish even more dramatically.

For, no industrial system

can be built from a lowering of consumption below the level necessary
to sustain life,
Of course, the progress of any developing society must depend
primarily upon its own efforts,

The case has been made that some

underdeveloped countries can increase domestic savings and capital for
mation by adopting the right kind of fiscal measures and by providing

people vdth incentives to work harder and more efficiently, 2

It has

been pointed out that not only is it the lack of advanced tools and
skills in UDC•s which defines the low level of development, but also
particular consumption practices which lead to a misapplication of
resources resulting in low levels of productivity and growth,

Given

their population problems, their primitive production network and other
hindrances, there is a limit to the amount that these poor nations can
do for themselves,
assistance,

Beyond this limit, their hope must lie in foreign

Without resort to assistance from outside the economy,

the means by which they can effect a positive rate of productive capital
1Kindleberger, Charles P., Economic Development (New York:
McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958), p. 55,
2Black, Eugene, "Can U,D,C.•s Catch Up?" p. 194,
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formation on their own are rather limited,

Not only is the under

developed nation unable to provide turbines, dams, automobiles, modern
hospitals, steel mills, machine tool industries, etc,, it cannot even
provide the new technology needed-for serious agricultural revision

1
for greater productivity.

For this it must turn to the lndustrial

societies,
It is in comparison to the developed world that the plight of the
poor nations becomes more manifest, For the industrial societies, the
choice is between great and greater levels of consumption as di.fferent
ways of orga:1izing and using resources are contemplated, For the
underdeveloped world, it is a choice between starvation and death on
the one hand and change and growth on the other.

The annual income per

person averages only $100 in the underdeveloped countries, 1�hereas in
the highly developed countries such as the U, S. the average is $2.,000.
Representing 60 per cent of the world's population the underdeveloped
countries receive only 9,2 per cent of the world's annual income as
compared with 26,2 per cent for the United States and 52,2 per cent for
2
Europe, According to a study made by the UNCTAD Secretariat3 the esti
mated. 1968-1969 increment in per capita G,N.P. was only $7 for the
developing countries as against $56 estimated for the socialist countries
1 Myrdal, Gunnar, The Challenge of World Poverty (New York:
··
House, Inc., 1970), p. 127,

Random

211No Muscle Is the Message," Commonweal, Vol. 25, January 7, 1972,
pp. 3 16, 317.

3uNCTAD, "Review of International Trade and Development 1969/i970,"
April 1972, Doc, TD/B/309, p. 6,
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and $91 for the developed market economy countries,

With 60 per cent

of the world 1 s population (excluding mainland China) and almost 80 per
cent of the annual increment in population, developing countries gen
erate only 12 per cent of world G,N,P.

During the much heralded U, N,

Development Decade of the 6o•s, per capita income in the developed
world increased by $650 while for the poor countries the augment aver
aged $40,

The great bulk of developed nations had rates of growth of

about 5 to 6 per cent a year while the underdeveloped nations had

growth rates of about 2 to 3 per cent a year, 1

To bring about a sig-

nificant rise in the rate of economic growth of the underdeveloped
nations and close the widening gap between their income and that of the
developed world, it is essential that the developed world provides
them with a substantial volume of capital resource1::.,
U, N, report

2

According to a

the total reQuirements of the underdeveloped countries

for foreign "development capital" were estimated at about $5,7 billion
per year during the first two five year periods-1962-1971-and at about
$4,7 billion per annum in the last five year period 1972-1976,
In an attempt to deal with the problem of capital shortage in the
UDC•s, tbe United Nations has, through its member States, established
particular institutions responsible for the transfer of capital to the
underdeveloped world, i.e., International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA), and

1

Ward, Barbara and P, T, Bauer, Two Views on Aid to Developing
Countries, (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 196 6) , pp . 8-1 0.
2u. N, Doc, A/Ac.102/5, ibid,, p. 73,
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International Finance Corporation (IFC),
subsequent pages,

These will be discussed in

In addition, the developed nations have also

attempted to deal with this problem outside the United Nations frame
work by providing bilateral aid,

The effort put forth thus far has

been insufficient to meet the task,
made,

Little or no progress has been

According to a U, N, report,1 the flow of capital received by

developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, although
higher in

1964 than in previous years continued to lag behind the

amount that could be effectively used,

In comparison with the total

output of the developed market economies, the flow of funds to the
developing countries and multilateral agencies was 0,84 per cent in

1961, and declined to 0,65 in 1964, Indeed, the goal set during the
Development Decade of the

60 1 s, that capital flows should reach 1 per

cent of the combined national incomes of developed nations was farther
from realization in

1964 than in 1961 when the target was set, The

disparity between the developed countries' gross national product (GNP)
and their provision of aid is still growing,

As Paul Hoffman 2 empha

sized, when "repayments on loans, interest payments, dividends, private
investment, and other relevant items" were deducted, "the actual burden
of development assistance on the world's tax payers was only about
billion in

1966.

totaled some

11

$3.2

In that year the GNP cf the major donor countries

$1,500 billion, and they spent $150 billion for military

purposes,
1 u. N., "International Flow of Long-Term Capital and Official
Donations, 1961-1965," in U. N, Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 3, June 1966,
pp. 37, 38,
2International Conciliation, No.

569, September 1968 1 p. 117.
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A review of international trade and development,

1 969-1970,

by

UNCTAD 1 indicates that the net flow of official and private financial
resources from the developed countries and multilateral agencies to
developing countries rose slightly (by 2 per cent) in 1969. At $12.4
billion, this flow represented only 0.67 per cent of the gross national
product of the developed world, a decrease from 0.73 per cent in 1968.
This involved a shortfall of well over $5 billion in capital flows as
compared to the target of

1

per cent of GNP.

In

1 970,

net disburse

ments of official development assistance from developed market economy
countries to developing countries and multilateral institutions amounted
to $6.7 billion or to 0,34 per cent of the combined GNP of these nations.
Official statistics covering financial disbursements from the centrally
planned economies are not readily available.

However, according to

reports from the recipient countries, bilateral commitments from this
area reached a total of $776 million in 1969, an increase over previous
years.2

UNCTAD3 reports that this figure more than doubled between

1 969- 1 970.

However, the prospects for an increase in total flows to

developing countries remain in doubt in view of uncertainties regarding
assistance from the U. S. which accounted for 45 per cent of official
development assistance from the market economy countries in

1 970.

1uNCTAD, "Review of International Trade and Development,
1 970,11 April 1972, Doc. TD/B/309, pp. 3, 4.

2uN Statistical Yearbook
U, N., 197 1 ), p. 7 1 0.

1 970

(New York:

The

1 969-

Statistical Office of

3uNCTAD, "Financial Resources for Development: External Develop
ment Finance," April 1 972, Doc. TD/118/Supp. 2., p. 28.
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ratio of U, S, rnfficial development assistance to its GNP declined
steadily over the decade of the 60 1 s and amounted to 0,31 per cent in
1970, 1

If the developing countrjes are to increase their rates of

growth and proceed with the task of development, there will have to
be an increase in the volume of capital being transferred into their
world,
Limitations to the present financial aid for development provided
by industrialized countries lie not only in the q_uantity of capital
being provided but also the q_uality and the channels through which it
is being transferred to the underdeveloped world,

In the view of the

poor nations, too much of the capital assistance being offered is pro
vided in terms of repayment which will impose a severe burden on their
balance of payments,

It is not enough, they contend, to provide loans

to pay for development projects; the loans must be on terms which permit
repayment and the payment of interest at a time and at a level which
will not cripple development subseq_uently,

Thus the insistence on the

establishment of a UNCDF for the provision of loans on a long-term,
low-interest basis.
As regards the channels of capital assistance, underdeveloped
nations have shown a preference for multilateral institutions, particu
larly those which affiliate with the UN,

Given bilaterally, they believe

that aid is used as an instrument of foreign policy,

In essence, it is

used in assisting other nations to attain economic, military, political,
and social conditions that will contribute to a world order conceived
1uNCTAD, Doc, TD/ 18, ibid,, p. 6.
1

to serve the ultimate interests of the donor country.
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1

Thus it is

used as a means of influencing domestic and foreign policies of the
recipient nations,

Underdeveloped nations also resent the many strings

and conditions tied to most bilateral aid procurements.

2

The charge of

neocolonialism frequently made by the developing nations against aid
donors stems from these beliefs,

Too often in donor countries, they

contend, political considerations tend to influence decisions concern
ing assistance,

The United Nations, in the UNDP, has the advantage, in

determining projects it will assist, of having no national political,
military or commercial goals control the decisions made,3

Because of

the belief that the United Nations has no special interests, the poor
nations are prepared to respect its advice, and accept the assistance
and supervision of the UN administration and coordination of external
assistance without any affront to their national pride and dignity,

A

second advantage is that the United Nations forum includes both rich
and poor countries,

Thus, it would give poor countries a sense of

participation in the processes and decisions of capital assistance
programs under the aegis of the United Nations,

For the capital rich

nations, the advantage in dispensing development funds through the
1
Montgomery, John D,, Forei n Aid in International Politics
(Englewood Cliffs, N, J,, Prentice-Hall, Inc,, 19 7 , p. 23,

2Benham, Frederic, Econ�mic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 86-96,

3Pearson, Lester B,, Restless Nations: A Stud of World Tensions
and Development, The Council on World Tensions, Inc, New York: MacFoaden-Bartell Corporation, 1962), pp, 87, 88,
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United Nations lies primarily in having at their disposal the rich
ex-_[lerience of its specialized agencies.

"In additjon," Kirdar states,

"donor countries -would win greater international influence and pres
tige and counter the criticisms which they are now facing,111 Finally,
such an acti.on would gradually build a sense of world community with
the r-ich and poor working together as partners in development.
Several autonomous agencies have been created to deal with prob
lems of development within the United Nations system, The financial
agencies affiliated with the United Nations that provide capital assist
ance to the less developed countries on a global basis are the agencies
of the World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, IFC).

Other m11ltilateral a.gencies

providing funris of this -1::,ype are regional in scope, such as the Inter
American DevelopmEmt Bank, the European Development Fund, the European
Investment Bank and the recently created African DeveJopment Bank.
Other multilateral agencies which are global in scope provide technical
rather than financial assistance,

To the extent that the U, N, Specj_al

Fund does provide assistance, the capital is for "pre-investment"
activities such as surveys of resources, rather than for capital invest

ment projects as such,2

It is necessary at this point, to analyze the

policies of the World Bank Group and determine the extent to which they
have succeeded in answering the capital needs of the underdeveloped
countries,

Findings will subsequently be related to the decision of

the U, N, majority to create a UNCDF,
1Kirdar, p. 320.

2Friedmann, Wolfgang, George Kalmanoff and Robert Meagher, Inter
,
natt._on�� Financial Aid, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) p. -9t.
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The World Bank Group
The IBRD was created in 1946 with the main purpose of making available world-wide loans to governments and, under governmental guarantee,
to private persons such as to business, industrial and agricultural
entecprise2 in the territories of its member st.ates.

Membership in

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a necessary condition for mem
bership in the World Bank and its affiliates,

The feeling at the time

of the Bank's creation was that the long-run financing it would provide
could not be effective without the reasonably stablo standards of

1
international 2xchange to be fostered by the IMF,

The communist bloc

countries are not among its more than one hundred member states,
The Bank's lending or its participation in the provision of finan
cial capital is limited to its member states and their political and
economic subdivisions,

Loans made or guaranteed by the Ba:1.k are,

except in special circumstances, for the pclrpose of specific projects
of reconstruction or development,
of

Its loans are not granted in support

:)Ver-all country-development programs,

2

Thus the semi-developed

countries like India or Brazil which have submitted economic projects
in accorda:1ce with the standards of the Bank have profited more from
the Bank's resources than the poorer countrles,

The Bank does not only

satisfy itself that a proposed project is economically j,1stifiable, but
also requires, as an additional condition that the project should have
1.b.d
l l •

1

p. 92,

2Blough, Roy, "The World Bank Group," International Organization,
Vol, 22, Winter 1968, p. 158,

41
a prod1JC�tive purpose,

On this point Kirdar states:

Although this is not explir:itJ.y defined in its agree
ment, the Ba.:ik, deriving it from the articles which set
out its purposes-e.g, to facilitate the investment of
capital for productive pu�poses-has made a practice of
financing only projects believed to have a productjve
capacity and has attempted to develop the term a:1d the
interpretation of what project should be considered as
"productive." According to this pra:::tice, community
projects such as housing, hospital, schools, etc. which
are essential needs of the underdeveloped countries and
the fundamental elements of economic development, are
not considered ai:; "productive" a:id not financed by it.1
In essence, this policy has prevented the Bank from :providing social
overhead capital desperately needed by the poor nations,

In making a

loaa, the Ba'lk is under the obligation to pay due regat'd to the pros
pects that the "borrower will be in a position to meet its oblie;ations
Lrnder the loan,

With interest rates .r anging beh1ee11 3 J/4 and 6 1/2

per cent, and with the possibility of further increase in these rates,
the poor nations cannot afford to borrow,2

In criticizing the Ba.o.k' s

policy Shonfield 3 states:
. , • the consequences of the World Ba'1.k's acceptance
of the logic of its position as a ba:1.ker has been th3,t
the semi-developed countries, with their anticipated
ability to obtain capital on the basis of their own
credit in international markets in the fairly near
future, have been allmrnd "to get away with thing�• that
are strictly de11ied to the poor, untrustworthy and
underdeveloped count,ries,
1Kirda:r, p, 120, For a illore detailed expla::-iation of this policy
see The World Bank Policies and Operations, prepared by the Staff of the
Bank and published by IBRD, June 1960, Washington, D,C,, p. 40,
2

______, "C-narity at 6 1/2%," The Economist, Vol. 221, Oct, 1,
J966, pp, 70, 71.

,,,shonfield,

Andrew, The Atta:::��£rld P�veriy,(Londo�:
& Windus, 1960).pp. 114, 115,
✓

Chatto
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Of grave significance to the q_Jest for a UNCDF are the terms on
which the Bank's loa:ris are given,

Millika:1. and Blackmer 1 agJ_·ee that

the broad purpose of capital assistance is to encourage the recipient
countries to maximize their efforts toward development.
tivenoss depends not only

0:1

Its effec-

the amount and kind of ass.Lstance made

availa'::l1e but also-and importantly- on the terms a:1.d conditions under
which foreign capital is offered.

Lending policies of the Bank are

modelled to a great extent on the best practices of private investment
banking�

Woile its principal aim is to promote the welfare of all its

members, it operates ac:cording to strict economic principles which have
served to limit borrowing by the underdeveloped countries.
During the formative years of the Bank, a greater portion of its
lending went to the highly developed countries for reconstruction pur
poses as compared to the lass developed areas.

It has, since then,

endeavored to provide more funds for development purposes,

Of the total

Bank loans of $5, 7 billion adva.1.ced up to the middle of 1961, about $1+
billio:1 represent loans given for development purposes.3

Of the total

Bank loans of $16 billion given during the period 1947-1971, $12,3 billion went for development purposes.4

Thus the Bank has succeeded in

channeling a greatly increased volume of funds from world capital
markets into developing countries,
1Millikan, Max and Donald 1, M. Blackmer, The Emerging Nations,
(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 196:l) p. 118.

2Black, Eugene H, , "Financing Economic Development," U. N. Review,
Vol, 8, No. 2, p. 20,

3 IJ, N, Doc, A/AC.102/5, p. 93
,

4Europa Yearbook, World Survey, 1972, Vol. 1, p. J6.
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However, i.ts major shortcomlng stems from its terms of len.ding.
According to a recent UNCTAO report (April 1972) 1 borrowing costs rose
from 5.52 per cent on the average in

1 967

to 6,47 per cent in 1969,

While some developing countries are no doubt in a position to pay cur
rent i�terest rates without adverse effects on their balance of pay
ments, the majority of these countries need access to borrowing on much
softer terms,

The indebtedness of these nations has become a matter

of great ooncern,

It has created a situation in whir;h loans to under

developed nations are being diverted from building dams and raising food
production or doing something else that might improve living standards,
to the "de.ad-end task of deb:t repayment,112 The UNCTAD Secretariat
report3 indicates

that the total ex-Eernal public indebtedness of eighty

developing countries increased at an average annual rate of
From $21 ,6 billion in 1961, it grew to $59,3 billion in

14

1 969,

per cent,
During

the same period, service- p·ayments on interests and amortization increased
at an average anni1al rate of 9 per cent and total service payments
amounted to $5 billion in 1969 and $5,9 billion in

1 970,

Amortization

and interest payments rose from 39 per cent of the inflow of loans and
grants in 1965 to 49 per cent in 1969,

These rates o:f increase compare

with annual growth rates of 6,6 per cent for exports and about 5 per
cent f.or income in the underdeveloped nations as a whole,

Projections

1uNCTAD, "Libel'.'alization of Terms and Conditions of Assistance,"
April 1972, Doc, TD/B/1.3/76, p .. 2.
211By and F'or the Ri8h," Nation, No, 205, November 27, 1967, pp.
5L�9, 550.
3

uNCTAD, "Financial Resources for Development: Debt Problems of
Developing Countries," 1969, Doc. TD/118/Supp. 6, p. 3,
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indicate that, in the absence of new measures to ease the terms of
assista:1.ce, a larger oumber of de-,reloping countries may be faced with
debt difficulties in the 1970's than in the 196o•s,

Net lending to the

poor countries might well become negative after 1975 if such terms
persis
. t .-1
In view of these estimations, the majority bloc in the General
Assembly felt the need to take some positive steps towards the estab
lishment of an access system whereby their domestic capital resources
could be supplemented by the inflow of external financial capital on
terms which would not hinder development efforts subsequently.

Though

many of the underdeveloped nations are members of the World Bank, it.s
decision-making apparatus is such that they have no effective voice in
policy-making.

All the powers of the Bank are vested in the Board of

Governors which consists of one governor and one alternate appointed
by each member of the Bank,

The power of each member lies in the amount

of shares to which it subscribes.

Each member has 250 votes and for

each additional subscribed share of capital stock ($100,00) they possess

one additional vote.2

The Bank thus has a weighted voting system3

which is completely different from the system- one vote, one nation
accepted by most U.N. agencies.

Although the Bank's a:r-ticles of agree

ment do not seem to stipulate a favoralJle treatment among its members,
1rnternational Conciliation, No. 564, Sept. 1967, p. 125,
also UNCTAD, Doc, TD/118, p. 12.

See

2Kirdar, p. 107,

3Mcintyre, E,, "Weigl1ted Voting in International Organizations,"
International Organization, Vol. 8, pp. 484-498.
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they grant to the largest shareholders an automatic and ruling majority
which is another kind of veto,

The United States and the United King

dom together exercise 39.38 per cent of voting power,1

With the par

ticipation of the next two largest share holders (France and West
Germany) they can together easily control the Bank and hold an operative veto power over any proposal which displeases them,

Not only

does the Bank not include any communist member in its body (except
Yugoslavia) it is also an institution steered by the leading countries
of the west,

Lacking the financial backing, its members from the

underdeveloped world are incapable of initiating changes in its lend
ing policies which would support their development efforts,
Realizing that the rates of lending by the Bank were a hindrance
to their economic progress, and also that its weighted system of vot
ing allowed the wealthier members predominant power in the making of
its decisions, the underdeveloped nations sought refuee in their cam
paign for a UNCDF,

Not only would the new agency's membership be open

to all me�ber states of the United Nations, but also-and more impor
tantly-it would be governed by the principle of one nation one vote,
with no regard for ideological or financial differences,

In essence,

the UNCDF ;ias to become a truly universal agency rather than a reflec
tion of a particular power bloc in the international arena,

Though,

by virture of their greater wealth, the more industrial or advanced
natio:i.s were expected to make a major contribution to the Fund, all
1

cordon, Wendell C., International Trade,(New York:
Knopf, Inc,) 1965, p, 503,

Alfred A,
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members were to participate equally in the making of policies regarding
the allocation of its resources,
The determination of the underdeveloped nations to establish a
UNCDF was equally matched by the op:;:iosition of the developed nations
(particularly those of the west) to the creation of such a fund.

Thus

during the course of the UNCDF debate, the developed nations consented
to the establishment of the IFC and the IDA which, it was "believed,
would undertake those activities which could not be carried out by the
Bank without some fundamental changes in its Articles of Agreement.

It

is worth noting that the developed nations of the west had insisted
that affiliatio!l with the Bank be a preconditio:-i for the establishment
Subject to the rules of the Bank, these agencies

of these agencies,

were to acquire its voting system,

In essence, the Western nations

would be assured of the po;rer to veto all proposals considered to be
inconsistent with their interests.
Established in

1956, the expressed purpose of the IFC was to fur

ther economic development by encouraging the growth of productive
private enterprise in member countries, particularly in the less
developed areas.

1

It provides risk capital for financing of projects

in thR private sector without government guarantees.

It deals directly

with private business people a'1.d does not invest in undertakings which
are owned or managed by governments,

As such, it is limited to the

financing of private enterprise rather than public utilities,

It is

thus exempt from the provision of social overhead capital desperately

1Friedmann, et. al., p. 91,
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needed in u�derdeveloped nations for the erection of schools, hospitals,
etc.

In practice, the Corporation has invested only in enterprises

which have a predominantly industrial character.

1

The funds of the

Corporation are released only when it has been assured that the private
investor can provide a major share of the capital needed for investment.
To the extent that private business people in the less developed
nations are able to accumulate the necessary investment funds to be
supplemented by the Corporation, and foreign private enterprises are
willing to invest in the developing areas, the Corporation could serve
as an effective means for the transfer of capital and skills to the
poor countries.

But, as already noted, amongst the people of the

underdeveloped world the propensity to save and invest is very low
because of the low level of income.

Secondly, u:'"tderdeveloped nations

hav·2 found it difficult to attract large amounts of foreign investment
at this stage of their development.

Political instability so prevalent

in the underdeveloped world and fears of expropriation have served as
limiting factors to foreign private investment,

Private capital move-

ments are confined largely to the developed sectors of the world econnmy,

2

Today the largest potential investor, the United States, has a

vast, prosperous internal market and is subject to no great pressures
-:.o invest.

On the merits of investment Evans J states:

1Kirdar, p. 18 .
3

2Schweinitz, Karl de, "The Needs of Undeveloped Economies,"
C1trrent History, Vol, 51, No. 299, August 1966, pp, 72-77,

3Evans, Peter B,, "National Autonomy and Economic Development:
Critical Perspectives on Multinational Corporations in Poor Countries,"
Internatio�al Organizatio�, Vol, 25, 1971, pp, 678, 679,
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Spreading capital from rich to poor is one function
classically attributed to international investment, but
on examination the direction of the capital flow appears
in doubt. A look at the current profitability of Ameri
can foreign investment suggests that. higher rates of
return are still achieved on investments in poor coun
tries, The rate of return on investments in LDC•s in
1969 was more than double the rate of return in devel
oped countries-8,J for developed and 18.J for LDC's,
nec:ent examinations of financial relations between the
United States and Latin America also suggest that LDC•s
eni up exporting more funds than they receive,
Higgins 1 contends that even if the lending and borrowing cou'ltries
made every .reasonable effort to encourage foreign investm•?nt in underdeveloped areas, the flow of private capital is not likely to fill the
gap between the c:apital requirements and domestic financial reE;oarces,
current or potential.

Some role will remain for foreign aid,

Beyond

+,his, the limits of specialization placed on the IFC, Le,, investment
only in private sector, prevent this agency from effectively meeting
the needs of t�e poor countries.
As the "soft loan" affiliate of the Bank, the International Development Association's expressed purpose is to provide finance to meet
the important development requirement of the underdeveloped countries
on terms which are more flexible and bear less heavily on their balance
of payments than those of conventional loans,2

The provisions governing

its financing have been drafted in very general terms and are very
flP-xible, in order to give the Association wide latitude to shape its
1
Higgins, Benjamin, Economic Development: Principles, Problems
and Policies, New York: W, W, Norton & Company, Inc,, 1959, p. 77, See
also Black, E, R,, "Can the UDC•s Catch Up?" p. 193,
2

Black, Lloyd D,, The Strategy of Foreign Aid, New Jersey:
Nostrand Company, Inc,, 1968, p. 108,

D, Van

financing on almost any terms and for a broad range of purposes.

Its

authorization provides for the financing of specific projects which
will make an important contribution to the development of its less

developed members whether or not these projects are revenue producing,1
3ligibility for the Association's financing has been limited to its
member countries which are located in less developed areas of the
world,
IDA lending has been on relatively generous terms,

It grants

50-year loans bearing no interest, except a small annual "service"
charge, and requiring no governmental guarantee,

Loans are not "soft,"

however, in one highly significant respect to the borrowing countries
they must be paid off in "hard" convertible foreign exchange.
usually means American dollars
dollars,

This

or a currency freely convertible into

Between 1960-1966, the IDA had made net commitments of about

$1,4 billion,2

By June 1971, it had extended 274 credits totalling

$3,3 million to 58 member countries of the underdeveloped areas,3
However, the Association has been facing the major problem of expand
ing its reserves,

It does not provide financing in the form of grant

in-aid,but its resources are meager in relation to the amount of capital
that would be demanded at zero interest,

Although the IDA Articles of

Agreement authorize it to borrow in financial markets, U,e interest-free
1Kirdar, pp, 165-266,

2

Blough� p, 155,

3 E,.rropa Yearbook, 1972, p, 33,
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terms of its development credits give it no basis for borrowing at this
All its funds have come from governments, from transfer of

time.

income from the World Bank, and from IDA•s net income.

Some developed

nations of the west have been willing to make supplementary contribu
tions to the Association's .resources, e,g,, Sweden and the United
States,

1

Because of the high interest rates of the Bank, its lending

operations have dropped,

Possessing credit that allows it to raisP

all the funds it needs in the world's capital markets, the Bank has
been able to maintain surplus reserves,

IDA, on the other hand,

because of its lending policies, has ha:i to continuously stress the
need for substantial addition to its resources,

Many of its members

have been reluctant to make major contributions to the Association's
resoQrces citing the increased bQrden on taxpayers and deficits in the
balance of payments as limiting factors,

2

Thus the factors which limit the Association's ability to meet
the capital needs of the poor nations lie on the demand and supply side
of its resource line.

In considering the policies of agencies such as

the World Bank Group, the central fact to note is that in general the
institution can do only what its governing members are willing to have
it do,

The activities of the Bank and its two affiliates have bene

fited almost every developing state, and indications are that the pace
of its lending operations will accelerate over the next deca:ie,

But the

key ohjective of the great majority of the developing states is to set
1

11Not Enough for the Needy," The Economist, Vol, 208, Sept. 21,
1963, pp. 1038-1042.

2

Blough, p, 175,
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up a capital development fund with the cooperation of the advanced
states,

The economic capacity of the industrial countries to support

a much larger flow of aid cannot be q_uestioned,

The constraints are

mainly political, contributions of governments depending on how impor
tant the governments believe the economic devel0pment of less developed
countries to be and on the willingness of their taxpayers t0 bear the
cost,

Thus the poor nations have advocated the establishment of a

UNCDF where representation of rich and poor will be eq_uitable.
Another possible source of wealth for the emergent economies is,
of course, their export of raw materials or trade surpluses,

The

developing nations fit into the cate�ory of export economies dependent
upon the sale of primary products,

As such they are subject to annual

and cyclical variations in the total real value of exports,

1

In the

course of world economic fluctuations prices of manufactured goods
have proved more stable than prices of raw materials and foodstuffs,
Thus, if the developing nations are to obtain a reasonably secure
prosperity, they must have some degree of certainty that they can sell
at reasonable prices and in reasonable q_uantity both the traiitional
exports of their primary produces and the products of their new indus
tries,

But, with output of most primary products persistently running

ahead of world demand, commodity prices are notoriously unstable, while
protectionism erects barriers which leave the developing countries with
poor prospects of exporting their new manufactures as these become
?

competitive,1
2

Buchanan & Ellis, p, JSJ,
Black, E. R,, ''Can UDC•s Catch Up?" p. 200.

U�CTA:O Secretariat report

1
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mad2 in April 1972 indicates that since

the beginning of the decade, the terms of trad.e of developed countries
have been remarkably stable, tending towards a slight long-term improve
ment.

In contrast, the terms of trade of devel8ping countries have

fluctuated considerably and followed a downward trend,

Between 1960--

62 terms of trade of developing countries declined by 5 per cent but
partly recovered in the two subseq_uent years,
proved to be of short duration,

The recovery, however,

In 1965 it fell by 4 per cent, by 3

per cent in 1967 and by 7 per cent in 1968.
There are several reasons why the pattern of trade does not favor
the developing nations,

First, the demand for their primary commodi

ties is vulnerable to the effects of technological progress in the
aivanced countries.

A substitute might replace a natural product

previously imported (synthetic rubber and fiber are good examples), or
improved techniq_ues may make it profitable to exploit domestic mineral
deposits of lower q_uality which were once considered unprofitable,
Secondly, the advanced countries are shifting their industrial expan
sion from the light industries, which are heavy consumers of raw mate
rials per unit of production, to the heavy industries, such as the
engineering and chemical industries, which req_uire a much smaller pro
portion of raw materials,

Moreover, their economic development is

characterized not only by the constant growth of secondary industries
but also by the rapid expansion of the tertiary (services) industries

--------

1uNCTAD, "Review of International Trade and Development, 1969,"
April 1972, Doc, TD/B/257/Rev, 1, p, 20.
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which create no demand for raw materials,

A rapid increase in the

demand for raw materials is also check8d by the economies in industrial
production which are made possible by modern technology; the systema.tic recovery and reprocessing of metals is an example,

The rlse in

the living standards of the industrial nations means an ever-incresing
demand for manufactured consumer goods and services rather than for a
5reater q_uantity or even a greater diversity of agricultural products,1
These adverse conditions convinced the developing nations of the
necessity of a UNCDF.

Let us now assess and evaluate the activities

of the UNCDF and relate these to its proposed functions as written in
its Statutes.
1

Kulski, Wladyslaw W., Internati.onal Politics in
Revolutionary
Age,(New York: J, B, Lippincott Company, 1964) p. 213,
;:i,

CHAPTER III
THE FAILURE OF ONCDF:

AN ECONOMIC DEFEAT

Dissatisfaction with the International Bank grew in the developing
world during the 1950's and 1960 1 s because of, inter alia, the terms
of its lending, the scarcity of loanable funds, and the dominant deci
sion-making position of the developed nations,

The failure of the Bank

to meet their capital needs was a continuing factor in the long fight
to establish a Capital Development Fund,

In spite of the vehement

opposition of the developed capitalistic nations and in spite of the
establishment of the Special Fund, the IFC, and IDA as substitutes for
the Fund, the developing nations continued the battle which culminated
in the establishment of the Capital Development Fund by General Assem
bly Resolution 2186(XXI) of December 15, 1966.
thing, and active responses to them are another,

But resolutions are one
National governments

almost always attempt to form and carry out highly independent foreign
policies.

Their membership in international organizations, i,e,, U. N.,

imposes characteristic tension when decisions made in these bodies are
believed to be inconsistent with their national interests,
point Gordenker

1

On this

states:

The deliberative organs of international organizations
mass proiuce recommendations, proliferate research pro
grams, multiply conferences and unroll what seems an end
less stream of field operational programs, These recom
mendations do not necessarily coincide with the policies

1

Gordenker, Leon, "The New Nationalism and International Organizations" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No, 1, Spring 1969,
pp. 31, 32.
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of a given government. The gap between the enuncia
tion of policies, as if an international community
existed and could be managed centrally, and the reaction
of individual governments acting as if they could decide
all their policies using "national interest" as the sole
guide to their courses, measures the degree of tension
which develops between international organizations and
member states,
Tne case of the Capital Development Fund is a classic one in
which an organ of the United Nations has created an agency against the
wishes of its more powerful members, thus plunging it into an environ
ment unfavorable for its operation and growth,

Because the political

will necessary to make the Fund succeed is lacking on the part of the
major powers, its road has been slow and full of frustrations,

The

political victory of the Assembly majority has indeed become a hollow
one,

This chapter will be given to an analysis of the activities of

the Fund in an attempt to determine the extFmt to which it has failed
to fulfill the hopes of its advocates, the developing nations, and why
it has failed.
Any assessment or evaluation of the Fund must begin with a
restatement of its purpose,

Its functions are clearly defined in its

statute and embodied in General Assembly Resolution 2186(XXI),

Because

it is only against this yardstick that one can truly measure the success
or failure of the Fund, these functions will be briefly summarized,
Article I of Resolution 2186(XXI) states:
The purpose of the Capital Development Fund shall be to
assist developing countries in the development of their
economies by supplementing existing sources of capital
assistance by means of grants and loans, particularly long
term loans maie free of interest or at low rates of interest,
Such assistance shall be directed towards the achievement
of the accelerated and self-sustained growth of the econo
mies of those countries and shall be oriented towards the
diversification of their economies, with due regard to
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the need for industrial development as a basis for
economic and social progress,
Its assistance is to be given to any member government of the United
Nations or of its related intergovernmental organizations, a group of
such states, or an authorized entity within such a state,

Its founders

also authorized that close liaison be maintained with other aid giving
sources such as UNDP, UNIDO, and the regional devalopmGnt banks,

In

direct opposition to the project-oriented approach of the World Bank
Group, the Fund's assistance was to be given to support genGral devel
opment plans or to meet general development requirements,
In addition, its statute fully describes the institutional and
financial arrangements by which the Fund is governed,
autonomous body of the General Assembly.

The CDF is an

A Manae;ing Diredor reports

to an Executive Board of twenty-four representatives elected by the
Assembly for a term of three years,

Control of all policies and oper

ations and final authority for the approval of grants and loans are
vested in the Executive Board on which the developed and devP.loriine;
countries are to be equally represented,

As regards its resources,

these are to be provided primarily by voluntary contributions,

Though

there is no specific figure in the resolution setting a minimum size
of resources or level of capitalization of the CDF, it nevertheless
states explicitly that the bulk of the contributions should come from
the economically more developed countries in a readily and economically
usable form,
ences.

These are to be replenished at annual pledging confer

The Secretary-General is also authorized to solicit contribu

tions from non-governmental sources provided such contributions are not
limited to specific recipient countries or for specific projects,
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In establishing the CDF the majority bloc in the twenty-first
General Assembly had expected that it would begin operational activi
ties early in 1968.
for October 1967,

Its first pledging conference had been scheduled
Its Executive Board was to be elected by the twenty

second General Assembly and the Secretary-General was to appoint a
Managing Director to assume 01·fice on 1 January 1968.1
the Fund was to begin the execution of its duties.

Thereafter,

But the poor

results of its first pledging conference made it necessary to alter
these plans,

Of the more than 120 member states of the United Nations,

only 64 had chosen to be represented at the conference,

Of these,

only 22 governments (all representing developing nations except Yugo2
slavia) announced pledges amounting to a total of $1,J million,
The
developed nations of the West and the East boycotted the conference,
In view of the initial lack of financial resources, the General
Assembly in Resolution 2J21(XXII) of December 15, 1967 req_uested the
Secretary-General to consider the possibility of using the management
of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on a provisional basis;
its administrator would administer the Fund by performing the functions
of the Managing Director; its Governing Council would perform the task
of the Executive Board of the Fund; and pledging conferences for both
UNDP and UNCDF would be held simultaneously)

Thus, the original mandate

1International Conciliation, No, 564, September 1967, p. 132,

2
General Assembly, official records, "UNCDF First Pledging Confer
ence," October 30, 1967, Doc, A/CONF,37/2. See also U, N, Monthly
Chronicle, Vol, 4, November 1967, pp. 4J, 44,
3rnternational Organization, Vol, 22, Summer & Autumn 1968,
pp. 753, 754.
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of the fund bad to be modified and provisional mandate given to the
UNDP administration,

Its status was changed from an autonomous agency

to an agency administered by the UNDP.

Though the basic objectives,

functions and guiding principles of the Fund had been maintained, it
was clear that continued boycott by the capital-rich world would
greatly impede its progress and in all likelihood prevent its objectives
from being achieved,
The limitations arising from the lack of financial support for the
CDF were pointed out by the UNDP administrator,
Governing Council, he indicated that as of May 1,

In his report 1 to the
1 968,

amounted to i 1 .3 million, but none had been paid in,

total pledges

The Fund's

establishment had been based upon the consideration that the develop
ing countries could usefully absorb substantial amounts of capital over
and above those which the existing financial institutions could pro
vide,

In view of the fact that these same nations, most of them in

acute balance of payments difficulties, were the primary source of the
resources pledged to UNCDF, a fundamental issue would appear to arise
as to whether their interests and basic objectives and principles of
the Fund would be properly served by authorizing operations on this
basis alone,

This, in essence, would amount to no more than "an

uneconomic redistribution of resources" contributed primarily by the
developing countries,

Unless the major industrial powers gave major

financial support to the Fund so as to permit it to initiate independent
operations, its role would have to be limited to joint-participation in
1

United Nations Official Documents, UNDP, "Report of Administrator;•
6th Session of Governing Council, Doc, DP/L,82.
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high priority development loans extended by existing international
financial institutions-particularly the regional development banks,
Under this method, the loan agreement provides that the lending insti
tution may allot a participation in the loan and that the payments of
amortization of and interest on, the portion of the loan represented
by the participation shall be made to the lending institution which
has sole responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the
loan,

Thereupon, UNCDF would finance the portion of the loan allotted

to it,

After remittance of the whole amount corresponding to its par

ticipation, UNCDF would receive a participation certificate,

While

normally the recipient would undertake the financing req_uired in local
currency, the loan agreement would provide for the financing of the
foreign exchange cost of the joint project-one portion of it to be
financed by the bank on its own account, the other portion open to
participation of UNCDF,

The maturity dates, the rates of interest,

the repayment currencies for the two portions may differ.

UNCDF would

hence make available to governments financial assistance by means of
its participation in loans.
terms ann r.onditions,

Assistance would be subject to its own

Thus, the bank could provide a loan financed on

its own account and a grant financed by participation of the UNCDF,1
Such cooperation would serve to soften lending terms by these institu
tions.

It would also be in accordance with its statute which stipu

lates that UNCDF maintain close liaison with other aid providing agencies,
1

united Nations official documents, UNDP Doc, DP/L. 82, pp. 17-19,
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To serve in this capacity, it was estimated that the Fund would need
a minimum of $10 million and a minimum figure of $100 million before
any thought could be given to the commencement of systematic and inde
pendent operations,
The Second Pledging Conference for the Fund was an even greater
disappointment,

Whereas 22 nations had pledged a total of $1,3 million

in 1967, in 1968 31 nations pledged the same amGunt,

1

Again, the

developed nations of the West and East (with the exception of Yugo
slavia which pledged the eQuivalent of $300,000 at each pledging con
ference) continued their boycott,

The financial crisis of the Fund

was brought to the attention of its creator-the General Assembly.

At

its twenty-third session (October-December 1968) the developing nations
again appealed to the developed nations to end their hostility to the
Fund.

Their demands were clearly intended to produce positive respon

ses from the rich countries which are expected to finance the assis
tance ani furnish some technical knowledge essential for development,
Though stridently voiced in speeches, these demands did not bring forth
responses satisfactory to the Assembly majority,

It,however, adopted

Resolution 2410 on December 17, 1968 by a roll call vote of 68 in favor,
9 opposed (including the U, S,, the United Kingdom, France and Japan),
and 18 abstentions (including USSR and other socialist states),

By this

it decided to extend the provisional mandate of the UNDP administration;
reQuested the administrator of the UNDP to identify specific projects
1
General Assembly, official records, "UNCDF Second Pledging Con
ference," Doc, A/CONF', 41/2, p. 2, See also U, N, Monthly Chronicle,
Vol. 5, December 1968, pp. 99, 100,
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in the program of different organizations within the U, N. system
which could benefit from investment within the scope of the Fund's
resources; and stressed the urgent need for the commencing of operations
of the Fund,
For the developing nations, the "revolution of rising expecta
tions" had become one of "rising frustrations" since the lack of
capital was vitiating development programs,

Realizing that the fate of

the Fund depended on the participation or non-participation of the
developed world, they urged that the Fund begin its operations immedi
ately in the hope that this might induce the developed countries to
join in the undertaking,

As the Indian delegate pointed out, "it was

obvious that, without the :participation of the developed countries, the
purpose of the Fund would be difficult to attain, but the developing
nations considered the venture too important to be further postponed,"1
In the same vein the Brazilian delegate declared:
The developing nations had all along wanted the Fund to
be an independent institution but they had faced one
frustration after another, It might well be that the
Fund would never succeed, Money was found in the U, N,
for a great many things including duplicative activities
and studies and reviews which would be of no benefit to
the developing nations, But no money was available for
those things that the developing nations found really
essential, He was thinking not only of the CDF, but of
trade, indL1strial development and the Development Decade,
Money and effort were being channeled into preparations
for the Second Development Decade but the wishes of the
developing countries for which the Dec�de was supposedly
being prepared were virtually ignored,
1

united Nations Official Documents, UNDP ?th Session of Governing
Council, January 1969, Doc, DP/SR,150, p. 178,
2
·b·d
l l ,

1

p. 184.
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The Fund had, thus far, proven to be an "economic failure."
continued existence was dubious,

Its

It could not, in view of the meager

resources, make "low-interest loans or grants" as written in its
statute, As the a:iministra·�or pointed out, it did not have enough
funds to cover administrative costs of negotiating, supervising and
collecting interest and capital repayments on loans,

Disbursement of

its resources would exhaust its liquidity at once especially since it
was geared toward provision of soft loans and grants.

He indicated

that the smallest average transaction being considered by the World
Bank was roughly equivalent to the total resources thus far pledged to
the UNCDF,

Its total resources pledged were equivalent to the combined

expenditure (UNDP and Governments) on a single UNDP pre-investment
project ($2,400,000) of which the UNDP contribution alone averaged
almost $1,000,000,

In comparison to the F'und, the pa.id-in capital of

the IBRD was $2,285 million as of September 1967.

This represented only

a small fraction of the commitments of member governments to contribute
to the a11thorized or subscribed capital of this institution and of its
1
total available resources, totalling many billions.

Considering its

inadequate resources, what role was the Fund to play in the field of
capital assistance?

Was it simply to serve as a reminder of the equal

sovereignty but the grossly unequal financial power of the developed and
developing worlds?

Some nations, Le,, Netherlands and Poland, sug

gested that CDF could operate within the UNDP serving as a "third win
dow" providing direct investment,
1

UNDP, Doc. DP/L,82, p. 8.

Other developed nations, particularly
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the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada maintained that
whatever the merits of the idea of establishing the Fund, it was no
longer justifiable in view of the existence of the IDA and the regional
development banks,

Wnile the objectives and functions of UNDP were

complementary to those of the CDF, they were not synonymous and UNDP
could not assume ipso facto responsibilities for the discharge of the
full range of international banking and investment functions,

In addi

tion, both the American and Canadian delegates protested strongly
against making compulsory contribution to the administrative expenses
of a body in which they were not interested and whose resources were
They could see no political advantage in keeping the Fw1d

negligible,

in existence therefore they could not approve the use of their contri
butions to UNDP either directly or indirectly to support CDF or its
1
The position of the developing countries was that the Fund
operations,
should exist as a separate institution within the United Nations or not
at all.

2

In response to the request from its seventh session to explore
possible ways of utilizing the contributions pledged to UNCDF the admin
istrator of UNDP presented a report3 to the 8th session of the Governing
Council (June 1969),

It singled out yet another obstacle to the progress

1uNDP, Doc, DP/SR,150, p. 182.
Vol, 2 3 , pp, 420, 421,
2

·b·d
:L l ,

,

See also International Organization,

p. 185,

3united Nations Official Documents, UN:'.JP "Report of Administrator,
8th Session of Governing Council," June 1969, Doc, DP/SR,167,
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of the Fund,

Of the $2,6 million that had been pledged, only $107,000

had been paid in, a:'ld of that 90 per cent was in non-convertible cur
rencies,

In the light of the acute problem of foreign exchange in the

developing nations who were the major contributors to the Fund, it did
not appear likely that many of the pledges could, as Resolution 2186
provided, be made available "in a readily or economically usable form,"
In effect, non-participation of the developed nations deprived the Fund
of hard (convertible) currency, i.e., dollars and sterling, the only
kinds of currency that carry any weight in international transactions.
Contributions from the developing world had been made in currencies not
freely convertible into dollars or sterling,

Thus the CDF could not

plan on financial operations in the strict sense of the word, i.e.,
banking or semi-banking activities,

Because of the non-convertibiltty

of funds, contributors were urged to make their contributions-" in
kind," i.e., physical capital-equipment, machinery, etc,

In essence,

the Fund was obliged to confine itself to the principle of "utilization,"
without excluding the possibility of receiving more flexible contribu
tions which would enable it to carry out its mandate,1

According to

this principle, equipment obtained through contributions "in kind" would
be made available to some of the projects financed by UNDP,

In an

effort to guard closely the already limited resources of the F.und, it
was decided that equipment be made available to recipient countries as
long-term loans rather than outright grants,
1

Repayments were to be made

United Nations Official Documents, "Progress Report of UNDP Admin
istrator," June 1969, Doc, D?/L.111, p. 2,

in the currency of the recipient countries and transferred to the CDF,
While agreeing that this method could set in motion "a fruitful process
of mutual assistance in capital goods among developing countries which
already possessed industries and those in the early stages of indus
trialization," the developing nations reiterated that such aid could
not replace the financing on a world scale which the supporters of CDF
had envisioned,

Its role had been narrowed down to the provision of

follow-up investment for UNDP-assisted projects and supplementary
assistance in conjunction with UNDP-assisted projects,
The results of subsequent pledging conferences showed that the
role of the CDF would indeed remain a subsidiary one unless there was
a change in the position of the major industrial powers, At the third
pledging conference held in October 1969, $1,317,854 was pledged by
the governments of 35 countries; the equivalent of $819,120 was
pledged by governments of J1 countries in October 1970; $973,364 was
pledged in November 1971 by JO countries; and the equivalent·of

$853,258 was pledged by J2 governments in 1972,1- Again, the developed
nations of the West and East (with the lone·exception of Yugoslavia)
boycotted the conferences,

As the Secretary-General pointed out, since

the major potential contributors had declined all invitations to attend
the conferences, there would be no real breakthrough in the nearly
static financial situation in which the Fund had been since its legal
establishment,2
1

The question before both developed and developing

Europa Yearbook, 1972, p, 97, Also, see attached document for
more detailed account of pledge conferences,
2
United Nations Official Record, A/CONF,51/SR,1, p, 2,
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countries was whether to let an institution created by an act of the
supreme organ of the United Nations drift towards a resounding failure
or whether they would decide to work together to normalize, stimulate
and develop the activities of the Fund and make it operational and
effective.

As the president of the Fourth Pledging Conference saw it:

The difficulties in making the Fund really effective
were to a large extent linked to the fact that inter
national solidarity and collective responsibility for
development were still vague concepts, not yet trans
lated into total and unrestricted commitments. The
basic truth had not yet been recognized that affluence
and misery could not coexist in a world of peace.1
In spite of these appeals, financial support has not been forth
coming from the developed world,

Other international financial bodies,

i.e., World Bank, though petitioned by the Secretary General, have
also refused to contribute to the Fund contending that since its
resources are meager, participation on their part is pointless,2

The

only contribution from a non-governmental agency was made by NOVIBJ, a
coordinating body of private organizations in the Netherlands con
cerned with development cooperation,

By making an unsolicited contri

bution of $50,000 in convertible currency, the organization had hoped
to show its support for the United Nations efforts to assist economic
and social development in the developing nations,

The hope of the

developing nations that CDF should become an important element in the
1·b"d
l l ,

,

J.b.d
l l ,

,

p. 4.

2United Nations Official Documents, UNDP, 10th Session, June 1970,
Doc. DP/SR,224, p. 216,
p, 214.
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U, N, development system during the Second Development Decade had, in
the light of their frustrations, greatly diminished,

Whereas these

nations, organized as a strong and cohesive voting bloc, were able to
exercise sufficient political influence to establish the Fund, they now
lacked the economic power necessary for its operationalization,

Aware

that their active support was needed in terms of financial contributions,
the developed nations maintained a united front in their opposition to
the Fund,
The Capital Development Fund has failed to become that viable
international financial institution responsible for the provision of
capital assistance in the form of "low-interest loans or grants" on a
world wide scale as hoped by the developing nations,

Whereas its scope

had included the financing of general development plans and programs,
it has, because of lack of support, been forced to limit itself to the
provision of supplementary assistance to UNDP projects and possible par
ticipation in loans given by the regional development banks, As of
December 1972, total contributions pledged amounted to $5,5 million
while actual payments amounted to $2.5 million-90 per cent in non
1
convertible currencies,

Possessing no power to compel its members to

give effect or respond positively to its resolution establishing the
Fund, the Assembly has continuously granted yearly extensions of the
1

United Nations Documents, UNDP Thirteenth Session, January 25,
1972, DP/SR,305, pp, 42, 43,

provisional UNDP mandate through a series of resolutions,1
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Also at the

insistence of the developing nations, the seventh session of the Trade
and Development Board of UNCTAD adopted Resolution 42 in which it urged
the developed nations to give financial support to the Fund,2

But

resolutions do not carry the power of automatic compliance by members,
Thus the existence of the Fund continues to be only nominal,
reports have simply reflected inactivity of the Fund,

Progress

Since its estab

lishment in 1966, its total list of activities consist of:
(1)

The purchase of two participation loans offered by the
Inter-American Development Bank at the cost of
$900,000 yielding 7 J/4 interest,

(2)

A long-term loa:1 of $400,000 for the purpose of small
farm tractors and accessories re�uired by the Green
Plan of Lebanon to assist the government in the
planned expansion of the country's plan for increased
mechanization of agriculture, Financed through the
Government of Yugoslavia's contribution to UNCDF
"in kind,"

(3)

A $340,000 UNCDF grant to the Government of Bolivia
for the purchase of 60 Diesel engine-driven pumps for
irrigation wells under UNDP project BOL 14 - Ground
water Development in the Altiplano, Financed through
the Governroen� of Pakistan's contribution to UNCDF
"in kind, "J

Because of its limited resources, sup-porters of the Fund have attempted
to find a new focus,

Its resources will henceforth be used to respond

1see General Assembly Resolutions 2410(XXII) of 17 December 1968;
2525(XXIV) ::if 5 December 1969; 2690(XXV) of 11 December 1970; and 2812
(XXVI) of 7 December 1971,

2General Assembly Official Records, 23rd Plenary Session, Doc,
A/7214/Supp, No, 14, p. 71,

3
united Nations Official Documents, UNDP Fourteenth Session, June
1972, Doc, DP/1.222, p, 2, Also Doc, DP/L,216, p, 4,

to the new emphasis on the least developed countries and their indus
trial needs.

Its support will now be given for the provision of a selec

ted number of small scale projects.1

These would be small scale plants

which are crucial to development but not large enough to attract finance
from other international institutions.

It was hoped that this new

emphasis would not change the basic objective of the Fund, which
remained capital development,

But continued frustrations have led to

suggestions that the Fund be abolished,

As the Philippine delegate

declared:
There should be no hesitation in admitting that the Fund
was a failure and that there was no justification for its
continued existence, It was the poor countries that con
tributed to the Fund and those countries had serious
development problems of their own. As far as disposal of
the present resources of the Fund, they should be returned
to the countries which had contributed to the Fund and
which could use them for more pressing needs,2
But in all likelihood, the majority bloc in the Assembly will continue
to extend. the UNDP mandate even if the Capital Development Fund exists
only as a symbol of their hopes and aspirations,
Clearly, the inability of the Fund to execute the tasks outlined
in its statute is a direct result of the lack of support from the
developed world.

In their frustration many UNCDF supporters hastened

to formulate their own explanations of the motives of the developed
nations in opposing the Fund, According to the Cuban delegate, "the
aim of the developed nations was to maintain control of the machinery
1United Nations Documents, UNDP Fourteenth Session, Doc, DP/SR.
33?, p. 1 43.
2·b·d
l l , , p, 146.

70
of international finance through the institutions which they domi
nated,111

It was indeed true that in the establishment of IDA and IFC

the developed nations of the west had shown that their capital assis
tance would be channeled only through those institutions in which they
retained effective control over policy making, As Asher2 states:
In the United States the acceptability of the multi
lateral alternative is based largely on the vision of a
well proportioned pyramid with the World Bank Group,
headed by a dynamic American president and governed
by the weighted voting at the apex, The rest of the
development machinery is assumed to fall neatly into
place somewhere below,
This statement is equally applicable to other members of the
developed world, All estimates show that a larger flow of resources
from devnloped to developing countries is needed,

They have also shown

that the developed nations are capable, economically, of undertaking
the increased financial costs in view of the continuous rise in their
Gross National Product,

The debate between the two poles thus centered

around the institution through which additional resources would be
channeled,

Whereas the developing nations had advocated the UNCDF in

which decision making power would be more diffused, the developed nations
of the west had insisted that a new additional capital-dispensing agency
was not needed, and that existing institutions, especially the World
Bank Group, in which they maintained preponderant power, be strengthened,
Their lack of political will was thus a major factor contributing to the
1united Nations Official Documents, UNDP, 184th meeting of Govern
ing Council, January 1970, Doc, DP/SR,184, p. 139,
2

Asher, Robert, "Development Assista::'.lce in DD II," International
Organization, Vol. 2 5, Spring 1971, p, 107,
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failure of UN�DF.

That their opposition Vias based primarily on polit

ical rather than economic considerations was confirmed by the French
delegate in his remark:
The hostility of the principal donor countries to the
creation of a CDF had been well known and the sponsors
of Resolution 2186(XXI) had known that it stood no
chance of being accepted by the countries which alone
could make it a reality. The scarcity of resources
mentioned by some people in that connection was not an
entirely satisfactory argument since it was in fact
always possible to transfer funds earmarked for bilateral
aid to a multilateral program, However, that was a
political decision, and a transfer of that kind was not
yet accepted by a number of governments, including the
French.1
The attitude of the socialist countries was less understandable
to the developing nations,

The polar extremes in the CDF debate had

been maintained by the developed countries of the West and the devel
oping countries,

Somewhere between the poles were to be found the

socialist countries whose attitude was, at best, ambivalent,

In the

initial stages of the CDF campaign, the Soviet Union had opposed this
idea contending that such proposals overestimated the significance of
foreign capital for economic development and tended "to encourage inter
vention in domestic affairs through channels of foreign capital and to
perpetuate the economic subordination of the developing nations,112
1Debate on UNCDF, Second Committee, General Assembly, 1085 meet
ing, December 1966 1 International O:cganization, Vol, 21, Spring 1967,
p. 449,

2Rubinstein, Alvin Z,, "Soviet and American Policies in Intec
nn.tio1.a.l Organizations," in International O:.cganization, Vol. 18, 1964,
p, JO, See also official records of General Assembly, Second Committee,
Sixth session, pp, 115, 116.
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By the fall session of the General Assembly (1953 ) the Soviet position
had altered sufficiently for support to be given to a resolution call
ing for the establishment of a CDF.

Nonetheless, it continued to

express serious reservations and counseled caution,1

By July 1955 the

Soviet Union had moved beyond its lukewarm acceptance of CDF and placed
itself s�uarely on the side of the developing nations.

It insisted

that the Fund not be placed under the World Bank (of which it is not a
member) but should be constituted as an independent lending authority,
with provision for an active and leading role for the developing
nations,2

In the establishment of IFC and IDA, Moscow found new evi

dence of the western bloc's attempt to preserve bilateral assistance
as an economic weapon for bringing political pressure to bear on cer
tain developing nations,3
Though speaking boldly in favor of the CDF, Moscow glaringly
refused to state exactly how much it was prepared to contribute to the
Fund,

One western Diplomat observed that "had the Soviets made a con

crete offer of $10 to $15 million dollars, the western bloc would have
fou�'ld itself in a politically impossible position and v-ronlcl have been

forced t0 support the Fund,114
neutralist position,

Instead the Soviet bloc now moved to a

In the roll call vote of December 15, 1966 by

1
ibid,, p. 31, See also ECOSOC official records, Eighteenth
Session, pp. 155, 156,
2·b·d
l l ,

,

p. 32,

J.b.d
l l ,

1

p. 33,

,

p. JJ.

4·b·d
l l ,
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which the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2186(XXI) thus establish

1
ing the Fund, the Soviet Union and other socialist states abstained,
They have, subsequently, refused to make contributions to the Fund,
thus further .contributing to its failure,

Only the major powers have the capacity to provide sustained and
significant infusions of capital into the developing nations and they
are prepared to resist a�y attempt to force them to channel aid through
multilateral institutions in which tangible political dividents may not
be forthcoming,

Indeed, there are very few instances where the nations

of the western bloc ac1d those of the Soviet bloc have contribut'3d to
joint ventures in economic development,

Most of t'leir aid programs to

the developing world have been inspired more by competition than by
cooperation,

The eco:-iomic failure of the Fund can thus be attribut,,,,l

to the innate conservatism of the developed nations on economic devel
opment and their unwillingness to grant international economic organi
zations the wherewithal to carry out large scale, non-profit capital
development projects,

Wiy these nations have chosen to oppose the Fund

is the subject of the next chapter,
1

General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-first Session, Decem
ber 15, 1966 1 Doc, A/6418,

ANN'iX 1
UNITED NATIONS CA.P[T�L DE\fB;LOPMENT FUND
Status of Contributions Pled�ed and Paid as at 1 March 1972
( In US Dollars)

1 9�-

Country
1,
2,
3,
4,
5,
6.
7,
8.
9,
1 0.
11 .
12,
13,
14.
15,
16,
17.
18.
19,
20.

Afghanistan
Algeria
Argentina
Barbados
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Burma
Cameroon
Ceylon
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Dominica� Repu�lic
Egypt
Ethiopia
Ghana

$

-

28,571
375

2,520
-

10,000

-

20,000
27,137
10,000

2,334
720
40,000
-

29,412

Contributions Pledged
1971
1969
1970

$ 5,000
20,000
30,000

2,520
-

10,000
402
20,000
18, 1 00

-

720
5,000
40,000
20,152
29,400

$

-

20,000
30,000

-

-

40,000
1 0,000

-

20,000
14,921

-

1,000

-

20,000
720
5,000
40,000

-

$

-

20,000
30,000

-

-

2,520
20,000
5,000
725
20,000
10,000

-

20,000
720
5,000
91,996

-

-

1 972

$

-

20,000
30,000

-

-

3,000
20,000

-

35,000
20,000
10,000

-

1,000

-

20,000

750

5,000
40,000

-

29,400

Total
Pledges
1968-1972
$

5,000
80,000
148,57 1
375
3,000
7,560
80,000
35,000
36,127
100,000
80,158
10,000
2,000
2,33L�
60,000
3,630
20,000
251,996
20,152
88,212

1united Nations Official Document, UNDP, Doc, DP/1,222

Payment
Received
$

-

60,000
118,571
375

5,040
-

30,000
1,127
60,000
60,158
10,000
1 ,000

-

40,000
2,880

-

80,000

-

-

Amount
Due

$

5,000
20,000
30,000
3,000
2,520
80,000
5,000

35,000

40,000
20,000
1,000
2,334
20,000

750

20,000
171,996
20, 1 52
88,212

ANN�X ( conti·'l.ued)

__ _______
.,._.

1968

Country
-----

21.
22.
2J.
24.
25.
26.
27,
28.
29.
JO,
J1.
J2.
JJ.
J4.
35,
J6.
37,
JS.
3 9,
40,
41.
42.
43,
44.
45.
46.

-

·-

--

M-.,

•

-�---

•-

.. -

...

----1972

Contributions Pledged
1969
1970
1971

____ ______ ___ __
.,.

J,000
J,000
15,000
J,000
J,000
Greece
- 150,000
500,000 500,000
India
50,000
12,500
Indonesia
12,500
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
Iran
Iraq
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
3,000
Jamaica
J,000
J,000
J,000
J,000
Khmer Republic
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
Kuwait
50,000
1,000
Laos
Le:::;otho
1,000
10,000
Liberia
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
Libyan Arab Republic
J0,000
J0,000
Malta
600
Mauritius
1,994
1,919
1,919
Morocco
9,960
10,000
9,960
9,960
Niger
25,180
21,583
7,000
5,600
5,600
Nigeria
7,001
100,000 100,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
Pakistan
People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen
100
10,000
10,000
10,000
Philippines
10,000
15,000
Qatar
10,000
Republic of Korea
Republic of Viet Nam 1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
10,000
10,000
Sudan
100,000
Thailand
Trinidad and
Tobago
2,474
2,400
2,400
2,400
2,474

-

-

-

-

-------------Amount

Total
Pledges
1968-1972

Payment
Received

- -------- -- -

27,000
1,150,000
75,000
50,000
40,000
15,000
4,000
50,000
1,000
1,000
50,000
60,000
600
5,832
39,880
46,763
25,201
800,000

-

500,000
75,000
40,000
J0,000
12,000
J,000
50,000

-

1,000
40,000
60,000
600
5,832
29,920

-

11,200
100,000

-

100
40,000
15,000
10,000
4,000
20,000
100,000

10,000
3,000
10,000
100,000

12,148

7,200

30,000

Due

27,000
650,000
10,000
10,000
J,000
1,000
1,000
10,000

9,960
46,763
14,001
700,000
100
10,000
15,000
1,000
10,000
4,948

---J
V1

ANNEX (�ontinued)

--

Contributions Pledged

1969

1970

1971

1,000
11,111

1,000

1,500

1,500

8,000

4,000

1968

Country

---------------------- - -- ..... ---· ·--47,
48.
49,

50,
51.
52.
53,

Tunisia
Turkey
United Republic
of Tanzania
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Zaire

-

-

-

-

300,000
7,000

J0,000
300,000

-

-

-

J00,000

- .. . ·---

1,291,6.51+ 1,317,8.51+ 819,120

=
Number of contributing
countries
Summary

1968
1969
1970
1971
i972

26

--

31

35

5,000
00,000
3
- ------

973,364

JO

---- -

--·---·-------- - -Payment
Amount

Total
- Pledges
1972
1968-1972

1,500

-

6,500
11,111

300,000
7,000

12,000
5,000
J0,000
1,500,000
14,000

32

53

·-

Received

5,000

11,111

i2,000

900,000
--------

$1,291,654
1,317,854
819,120
973,364
853,258
---5,255,250

-------

Payment
Percentage
of Pledges
Received
- - - ------ -·- - -----------

$1,235,434
65,202
531,120
132,264
1,99!+

z,"51��

1,500
5,000
J0,000
600,000
14,ooo

853,258 5,255,250 2,516,014 2,7 3 9,236
----------

Contributions
Pledged

------ -- --

Due

95,6
46,7
64,8
13,6
0.2

Balance
Due

$

56,200
702,652
288,000
841,100
851,264
3 2
f�f �!. 3�
�
o,

Cl-l4.PmR IV
CONFLICTING PERSF!£CTIVfES
The relevance of distorted images and misperceptions to the
analysis of any international conflict lies in their capacity to com
pound the objective conflicts of interest that are ever present between
nations,

There has always--and in.evitably-oeen some divergence,

attributable to the imperfections of the human mind, between the world
as it is and the world as men perceive it,

Nowhere is this element of

blurred subjectivity more prevalent than in the realm of international
politics,

Here, as elsewhere, the distinction between perception and

reality is always arbitrary,

For, each actor's perception of himself,

of others, and of the political game is shaped by his own experience
or national situation which is not the same as that which matters to
and moves other actors,1

Each actor possesses an ordered, more or less

consistent picture of the world to which his habits, tastes, capaci
ties and comforts have been a::ljusted,

In so far as these perceptions

serve as the springs and fuel of action, they mold political reality.
For, each actor attempts to project upon the world its own sense of
value, of its position and of its rights.

It is this attempt to shape

1Hoffman, Stanley, "Perceptions, Reality and the Franco-America::1.
Conflict" in John C, Farrell and Asa P, Smith, (eds,) Image and
Reality in.World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),
p. 57,
77
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political reality in accordance with the actor's own perceptions which

gives rise to much of the conflict in the international arena,2

A further distinction can be made in the perspectives of nation
states as a function of their international position,

Helge Hveem3

contends that there are world perspectives characteristic of center
and periphery nations respectively,

The proposed differences in atti

tude towards existing world order and towards change are due to the
fact that the center nations (major actors) are the "have's" and that
nations as well as individuals strive to preserve what they have,

The

center perspective on the international system is that present trends
of development should merely be exJc.capolated into the future,

It will

accept deviations from these trends and from the behavior found com
patible with its own interests only insofar as these deviations do·not
threaten the values or the position of the center nation,

It will

thus advocate change within the system while the periphery nation will
take a more radical approach advocating significant changes or total
rejection of the system,
Thus, there is a sharp division in the perspectives of the devel
oped and developing nations of the world,

This difference in perspec

tives has given rise to fundamentally different images of development
reality,

The different attitudes of these two blocs towards the Capital

l l ,
1.b.d

,

p. 58.

2Hveem, Helge, "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Inter
national Position," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. VII, No, 2, 1972,
pp. 74, 75,
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Development Fund can be regarded as a surface manifestation of these
conflicting perspectives,

Perhaps an analysis of this subjective dimen

sion will aid in the identification of those blinders imposed by nation
alism, ideology, and rigid thinking and contribute to unde.r·standing
why the developed ".'lations have consistently opposed the Fund while the
developing nations have insisted upon its existence,
The Developed Nations' Perspective
Development, in its broadest sense, is that historical process by
which societies evolve from primitive tribal states to complex indus
trial societies,

While all nations have expressed -the desire to see

the developing nations improve their standard of living, each has its
own vision of what that process entails,

In discussing the views of

the developed nations, attention will be focused primarily on the United
States and the Soviet Union,

As super-powers, these two nations hold

the reins of leadership in their respective blocs,

Using their pm·1er

and influence, they can persuade or coerce their allies to behave in
accordance with their own perceptions of development and of the world,
Broadly speaking, the developed nations of the west conceive of
economic development as moving forward within an international economy,
Their view of development tends to emphasize comparative cost princi
ples, regional specialization, and substantial, if not exclusive,

reliance upon prices and markets to organize and guide production,1

1The descriptions utilized here are obviously general and brief,
They are intended only to represent basic thought patterns rather than
to provide a comprehensive analysis of developmental ap:;:iroaches, For a
more detailed study see Buchanan, Norman S,, "International Finance,"
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This tends to mean that, at least initially, further development in the
low income areas would build upon already established primary product
industries.

As these develop further and increase their efficiency,

ancillary industries would grow up around them.

The traditionally

mutually profitable interchange of raw and semi-processed primary
products for manufactures from the older countries would continue and
expand,

Private capital from abroad would assist this expansion,

Industry and commerce would thus develop "naturally" as local capital
accumulated and the requisite technical, managerial and professional
skills diffused amongst the people.1
If economic development is essentially so conceived, then the
emphasis is upon gradualism, private enterprise, resort te> the price
system, international specialization, domestic capital accumulation and
fairly direct linkages between foreign borrowing, expansion of exports
and de·bt service maintenance,

The attitude of many western nations,

particularly the United States, is that their interests and those of
the developing world can best be served by primary reliance on move
ment of private capital from developed societies to developing.
has always been an ideological commitment of faith,

This

As a corollary to

this faith, the United States' policy has been intent upon encouraging

Bernard F, Haley (ed.), A Survey of Contemporar Economics, Vol. II
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard Erwin, Inc, , 19 52 }, p. 338,
1 Buchanan, �oaches to Economic Develo :rnent, p, 376,
p
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private direct investment from abroad in developing countries,1

On

the international level, this emphasis on private capital is reflected
in the policies of the World Bank Group, particularly the IE.RD and the
IFC,

The Bank has, on numerous occasions, expressed its firm convic

tion on two points:

first, that the major portion of the capital

necessary for development must come from within the country itself;
second, that foreign financial assistance should come chiefly from
private sources,

2

It has thus consj_stently refused to finance publicly

owned industrial projects,

Its justification lies in the belief that

private ownership is the best way of assuring continuity of efficient
management and sound investment policies)

In recent years, it has

modified its stand considerably, however, and might do so still
further,
The role carved out for large-scale capital assistance in this
scheme of development appears to be minimal,

For, it assumes that

under competitive conditions trade and private foreign investment are
likely to promote economic development of the poor countries,
provides a market for primary commodities and raw materials,

Trade
The

export revenues can be used in part to finance the imports of capital
equipment needed to increase productivity in agriculture and industry,
With U1e passage of time, the steady growth of foreign demand for
1Krause, Walter, Ee onomic Develo�p._me
_ _nt
_ _:_T_h_e_U_n_d_e_r_d_e_v_e_l_o_._p_e_d_W_o_r_l_d
and the American Interest, (San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Com
pany, Inc, 1961) p. 304, See also Myrdal, Challenge of World Pov�rty,
p . 325,
2

Buchanan, "International Finance," p, 337,

3International Conciliation, No,

576, January, 1970, p, 13.
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primary products and the groi•1t!1 of domestic industry according to
comparative advantage, the developing countries become developed,

1

The assumed automaticity of international market forces has not,
in reality, yielded the expected results,

As Myrdal 2 points out, !'the

advice which the poorer countries receive from the richer is often
directed toward increasing their production of primary goods for
export,"

But trade, by itself does not lead to development; it rather

tends to have backwash effects and to strengthen the forces maintain
ing stagnation and repression,

What might produce increased capital

earnings if pursued by one or several countries, may, and has, produced
lower capital earnings when a large number of developing countries
seek to gain advantage by increasing primary commodity production,
with a resulting glut on the world market and depressed prices, Nor
can private capital movements be relied upon to counteract international
ineq_ualities,
areas,

On the whole, capital tends to shun the underdeveloped

There are several reasons for this,

One is the attraction of

investment opportunities in the industrialized countries themselves,
Another is the much greater risk that investment in developing countries
entails,

Threats-actual or potential-of loss of investment as a

result of revolution, civil war, expropriation, or nationalization are
factors that tend to discourage potential investors,

Other reasons

include lack of a mass market, the difficulty of repatriating profits,
1Pincus, John A, (ed,), Reshaping the World Economy (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc,, 1968), p, 6,

2Myrdal, Gunnar, Rich Lands an<! Po?r (New York:
Publishers, 1957), pp, 52, SJ,

Harper & Row,

83
heavy shipping and insurance costs, lack of infra-structure facilities
to support productive enterprises, hostile political and military
elites, discriminatory taxes, a�d the lack of a skilled labor pool.
Thus, from the perspective of the developed states, foreign aid should
be aimed at correcting many of the conditions that discourage private
entrepreneurs from transferring capital to the developing states
through investment; in particular, this has meant an emphasis placed
on technical assistance, education, health, and infra-structure devel
opment.

Aid in the form of capital to build productive enterprises

has, on the other hand, been rarely offered and in extremely small
amounts by the advanced capitalist countries.

This has also been true

of United Nations programs which have generally reflected the biases
of these leading capitalist states.
The roots of the Soviet bloc's conception of development are
also embedded in its own ideology-the Marxist-Leninist theory, and
its developmental experience.

Regarding the flow of private investment

as the means by which the west retains control over former colonies,
the Soviet prescription for rapid development of the underdeveloped
countries includes:

a) stimulating the growth of the public sector;

b) building large scale heavy industry; and c) encouraging national
planning,1

The Soviet approach also calls for reduced consumption

and a ruthless use of state power directed at securing large-scale
capital formation.

~----

The belief that the long-term development needs of

1Jaster, Robert S., "Foreign Aid and Economic Development: The
Shifting Soviet View·,·• For�_i�ffairs, Vol. 45, J,.11y 1969, p. 455,
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the developing countries cannot adequately be met by agencies whose
operations are based on the short-term profit motive or by private
investment capital was presented by the Soviets as a supportive argu

ment for the establishment of the Capital Development Fund.1

Soviet

analysts have consistently acknowledged the suborri inat.i on of foreign
economic assistance to domestic activity in developing countries,

In

their view, rapid development would occur with the expansion of the
state sector,

With an increase in d0mP.stic savine; ;;mi investment in

heavy industry, output would be increased,

E xport of manufactured

goods would yield revenue needed for further industrialization,2

Thus, during the Capital Development Fund debate, the Soviet bloc
P.mphasized that the main purpose of the Fund should be "to assist in
the industrialization of the developing nations through the develop

ment of the state sector of their economies,3

Accordingly, the bulk

of its economic assistance has been given in support of the public
sector and industrial projects and it has stressed that trade, not
aid, is the most important and mutually advantageous type of economic
ties between the socialist and developing worlds,4

Soviet aid has gen

erally taken the form of credits to spur such trade arrangements,
1ECOSOC, Official Documents, Thirty-sixth Session, Doc, E/3790,
p. 16.
2

Valkenier, Elizabeth, "New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations
with the Third World," World Politics, Vul. 22, April 1970, p. 424,
JECOSOC, Thirty-sixth Session, Doc, E/3790, p, 16,

4Jaster, p. 456.
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Theoretically then, the developed nations view foreign economic
assistance as a supplement to internal saving in the developmental
process,

Other factors, i.e. r state ownership, trade, private invest-

ment, et0.,, have been assigned pivotal roles in this process.

Never-

theless, the deveJ.oped nations have been v-rilling to provide a signlfi
cant, though insufficient, a.mount of economic assistance to the developing world.

There is no doubt that they recognize the need in the

developing nations for investment capital.

A general concern for

human welfare has also prompted the developed nations to provide assistance,

But these have not served as primary motives for assistance,

As Pincus 1 points out, "if humanitarian motives were paramount, the
claims of starvation in China should be no less than those in India,"
It would not matter whether a:::,sistance was provided through bj_lateral
channels or through a United Nations Capital Development Fund.
Overarching the specific humanitarian and economic motives for
assistance, political dimensions are also incorporated into the devel
oped world's image of development.

Both East and West have a vj_ewpoint

to advance, a position to defend in the international arena,

Both

realize that development entails profound social transformation and
political awareness and that these changes will inevitably affect the
world community,

What each side envisages is a developing world 1,hich

conforms to its own perceptions of worJd order,

Each attempts to shape

the world according to its own ideological commitment,

The west tends

to vi.ew the developing areas idologically as an arena where the forces
1
Pincus, John A., Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor
NaiJ.ons (New York: McGraw::.Hill Book Company, 1967), p, 12.
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of freedom and communist absolutism strive for control.

On this point

Montgomery1 states:
United States post-war diplomacy has assumed some respon
sibility for encouraging conditions favorable to a world
order that will neither endanger the security of the United
States nor threaten the elements contributing toward free
dom in other countries. Economic development, technical
modernization, and social and political reforms are bound
up with this American commitment.
Conversely, the Soviet bloc looks on the developing world as the center
of the struggle of the impoverished masses to overthrow imperialist
( western) control.

It regards the "liberation" of these states as a

crucial step toward the ultimate objective of a communized world.2
The great powers really want the same thing:

for the world to be

organized in their own images, or at least in ways that are not hostile
to their images,

Thus the concern is not only for a betterment of

P.�onornic conditions in the developing nations but also for the con
comitant develorment of particular political institutions whi�h concur
with their ideological orientations,
The range of instruments available to the developed nations in
advancing their conceptions of world order includes military action,
military aid, and more importantly for this paper, economic assistance,
Indeed, developmental assistance has become a major element of fon,ign
policy of these nations,

Much of its value as a flexible and multi

purpose instrument of foreign policy of the developed nations springs
1Montgomery, John D., Foreign Aid in International Politics,
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc,, 1967) p, 18,

2
London, Kurt, New Nations in a Divided World, (New York:
Praeger Publisher, 196JJ p, 205,

8?
from the ways in which it can be used to influence recipient countries'
development policies, aspects of their current politics or foreign
policies and their long-run political evolution rather than from its
resource-transfer function.

1

As Asher

2

points out:

Developm9ntal assistance tends to provide an accept
able opening wedge for a mea:'.ling ful dialogue between
donor and receiver on matters that extend far beyond
the specifications for the generators, tractors, trucks
or fertilizers to be imported,
In autumn 1964, A,I,D, administrator David Bell, addressing an aca
demic conference on political development described "development of
democratic institutions and support for broader political participa
tion as important aspects of A. I.D. 's goals." 3

Similarly, Title IX

of the United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 explicitly states:
In carrying out the programs authorized •• , emphasis
shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in
the task of development on the part of the people of
the developing countries, thro1-1gh the encourageme11t of
democr�tic private and local governmental institu
tions,
Soviet Premier Brezhnev stated the Soviet position in a speech to the
Supreme Soviet in April 1968,

He indicated that "the scale and con

crete forms of Soviet relations with the new states would depend on the
general direction of a particular country's policies,"

The most

1Nelson, Joan, Ai�, Influence, .::Lnd Foreign Policy (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 2.
2

Asher, Robert, International Development and the U, S, National
Interesc (Washington, D,C,: National Planni:'1g Association, 19€;7f;-;--: 15,
3Nelson, p. 142.

4

·b·d
l l ,

,

p. 144.
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intimate ties, he emphasized "would be established with countries
which have ta·�en the socialist path, 111

Such have been the consider

ations which have gui..ded economic assistance to thP developing world,
The underlying assumption and expectation of the developed world's
policy is that the recipient countries will gratefully follow their
advice in conducting their domestic and foreign affairs.2
Generally, the developed world views development of the under
developed nations in terms of its own national interest.

For the west

the stakes are, at a minimum, denial of additional areas to communist
rule and, at a maximum, the development of capabilities of these
societies for democracy,

For Moscow the stakes are denial of this area

to the west in terms of both military strategy and economic resources
and in the long run its conversion to communism,3

Economic assist-

a.nee has been utilized to a significant extent by the developed world
to shape the direction of change in the developing nations and to
influence their international political alignments,4

It is thus vi..ewed

as a competitive enterprise rather than a cooperative effort,
The tendency, on the part of the developed world, to fashion and
adopt economic assistance programs for developing countries so as to
fit their own national interest has an important consequence,
1Jaster,

p.

This has

463.

2Geiger, Theodore, The Conflicted Relationshi£ (New York:
Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 40,

McGraw

3Bloomfield, Lincoln, Ihe U� N, and U, S, Foreign Policy_:-�-New
Look at the National InterestlB"oston: Little, Brown and Company,
1967T,-i;:-r9f-:-

4Asher, International Development and The U, S, National Interest,
p. 15,

meant a reluctance and unwillingness on their part, to support attempts
to implement multilateral and cooperative action for aiding the devel
oping countries within the United Nations framework.1

Their attitude

toward the Capital Development Fund is illustrative of this point.

If

the national interest is so closely linked with developmental assist
ance then it seems natural that the developed world would prefer tbe
bilateral approach which gives the donor country economic and political
control over the terms of aid and permits it to reap credit if things
go well.

From their viewpoint, the problem with multilateral aid

revolves around the issue of control (making the ultimate decision as
to who receives what assistance, for what purposes, and with what kinds
of conditions and behavior requirements). So long as the world is torn
by political divisions-so long as assistance must serve political as
well as economic and humanitarian aims-there will be a limit to which
they are willing to channel aid through international organizations.
This, in essence, is the basis of the developed nations' opposi
tion to the Capital Development Fund.

In their perspective, the polit

ical goal, a friendly developing world or at least a neutral one is
worth a good deal but its relation to the economic and political con
2
cessions which the Fund entails is not clearly demonstrable.

For, what

the Fund represents is a separation of developmental assistance from
the national goals and objectives which provide the real substance of
the developed world's foreign policy.

What they are unwil1ing to do

1Myrdal, Challenge of World Poverty, p. 346.
2Pincus, Trade, Aid a�d Deve������' p. 349.
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is lose control over the pattern of distribution and allocation of
capital assistance to either an ideological opponent or recipients,
Not only is the Fund an attempt to solicit more economic assistance
from the developed nations, it is an attempt to establish a new basis
for its distribution,

The guiding principles of the Fund leave no

doubt that there is a deliberate attempt on the part of its framers
to transcend the ideological conflicts so prevalent on the international
front and to cut the political strings attached to aid-giving,

But

ideologies die hard and self-interest or perceived national interest
continues to serve as the determinant of foreign policy,

The central

q_uestion in policy making for any nation is whether the credits exceed
the debits, whether as a whole the institution will make a net con
tribution to its national interest,

In the view of the developed

world, capital assistance disbursed through the Capital Development
Fund would not assure the promotion of their foreign policy objective,
i.e., politically aligned developing nations,

As Gardner explains the

American position, "assistance would very well be given to communist
countries if channeled through the Fund,111

Thus for the developed

nations of the west the World Bank has a natural appeal since they
hold predominant power,

For the Soviet bloc, bilateral channels might

well remain the primary route for capital assistance in spite of its
verbal support for the Fund,
From the developed states' perspectives, both capitalistic and
communistic, short-term national interests are best served by bilateral
1 Gardner, p. 120,
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aid programs since they facilitate the achievement of foreign policy
objectives.

Yet, long range goals might be incompatible with short

range objectives,

A multilateral capital aid program that produced

strong, jndependent and economically and politically viable states
over the long run might be the most realistic and pragmatic policy
for the United States since it would be compatible with American
interests in avoiding revolutions and turns to the political Left
that may sweep the developing world if modernization programs are frus
trated,

A narrow-visioned anti-communist bilateral aid program is

unlikely to produce this kind of long-term stability.

Policy makers,

however, are typically not concerned with long-term results; their
effectiveness is judged only in terms of immediate or near-term impact
and results,
Developing Nations' Perspective
The developing nations tend to conceive their own economic devel
opment in terms different from those of the developed world,

They

believe, contrary to the prevailing view in the developed countries,
that. their development should stress industry and manufactures for
home consumption, diversification of their economic structure, and

lessened dependence upon the already developed countries.1

What they

desire and regard as necessary for economic independence is achieve
ment of substantial structural change, i.e., a fundamental reshaping
of the pattern of production.

Their objective is to see some fairly

1
Buchanan, "International Finance," p. 339,
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pronounced shift in emphasis from raw materials production geared to
export (e,g,, agriculture or mineral exploitation involving exporta
tion of ore in unprocessed form) to greater diversification in pro
duction, preferably including industrial development,1
The emphasis on industrialization and manufacturing stems from a
strong conviction that no matter what measures are taken to improve
conditions of trade in primary materials, the long-run prospects are
not encouraging for most of the basic commodities in which they
specialize,

Hence to continue being primary producers for the world

market would mean a continuance of low levels of income, economic
dependency, political weakness and a generally humble role in world
affairs,

Manufacturing is thus regarded as essential in the moderni

zation process,2
It is this preoccupation with industrialization that enables the
Soviet bloc to pose as the champion of the developing nations' cause,
The Soviet Union pictures itself as a proponent of industrial develop
ment, regarded in the developing world as synonymous with economic
development and offers itself as living proof that this method can
lead to rapid development,

The Soviet bloc apparently has felt that

its own cause is best served when it caters to the widespread and
largely unmet desire for industrial growth,

Accordingly, its assistance

has been given in support of industrial projects)
1Krause, p,

The whole thrust

475,

2Frank, Isaiah, "New Perspectives on Trade and Development,"
Foreign Aff��rs, Vol. 25, April 1967, pp, 531, 532,

3Mosely, Philip E,, "Communist Policy and the Third World," The
Review of Politics, Vol, 28, No, 2., April 1966, p, 230,
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of Marxism- Leninism as an ideological weapon has, since the Khrushchev
era, changed from one of predicting and encouraging the collapse of
capitalism in the advanced states to one of "selling" communism (i.e.,
socialism) as the best, swiftest, surest, fairest, and least painful
road to development and the building of a modern society in the Third
World.

Even so, the developing world regards the Soviet Union as just

another great power bent on furthering its own ideology through propa
ganda,

They realize that Soviet verbal support on matters concerning

developmental assistance is an asset of dubious value because of the
Soviet's unwillingness to match this support with req_uisite amounts of
financial support.
On no point perhaps is the divergence of conviction between the
developed and developing worlds more overt than on the score of the
appropriate magnitude, sources and conditions of capital supply.

The

developing nations aspire to rapid economic development, to national
self-sufficiency, and more specifically, industrialization--all of which
req_uire vast sums of capital.

Much of this money, they believe, must

come from abroad to avoid pressure on domestic living standards or
even to permit some increase in per capita consumption,1

Population

pressures, political unrest, etc,, force them into a broad scale
assault on the development problem,

In their view the traditional

seq_uences of development offer little hope of success,

Not only does

this imply a different pace for development but also different amounts
and kinds of assistance from the developed world,

If development

1Buchanan, Approaches to Economic Development, p, 376,

stresses creating industries to serve the home market then outside
assistance must be in the form of very long-term loans at nominal
rates or outright grants,

Debt burden accrued from high interest

rates on loans tends to impede progress,

Trade surpluses cannot be

relied upon to provide ample revenues for the servicing of these loans,
The desire for heavy outlays in education, health and housing further
reinforce the case for very long-term loans at low interest rates and
for grants,
The major theme stressed by the developing nations in their sup
port of a Capital Development Fund is the desire for a substantially
lessened dependence on the developed world,

The underlying conviction

here is that their new found independence is nominal if economic
dependence is perpetuated,

In their quest for development, the strat

egy of the developing world is to request an increase in the capital
flow from the developed world without offering political concessions
.
in return, 1

Economic assistance always has strings attached, even if

they are as impalpable as a sense of dependence on largesse,

In the

view of the developing nati-ons, this sense of dependence is minimized
and political independence is more secure when assistance is channeled
through multilateral agencies, particularly those under the aegis of
the United Nations in which they can participate in policy making.
Bilateral channels, they contend, are incompatible with national
dignity .
1

Senator Fulbright 2 concisely summarized a view to which most

Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, p,

2Fulbright,

295,

William J,, The Arrogance of Power (New York:
Random House, 1966), p. 2 24,
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of the developing nations would subscribe,
Bilateralism errodes both the rich and the poor, breeding
an exaggerated sense of authority on the part of the
donor and a destructive loss of self-esteem on the part
of the recipient.
As they see it, assistance channeled through an organization such
as the United Nations Capital Development Fund would limit the
"leverage" that any one developed nation or bloc of nations could
exercise on their policies and actions.
Beyond the need to safeguard their political independence and
maintain pride and self-respect is the desire to assert themselves
politically and carve out a role in world politics,

Whereas the

developed world is bent on using economic assistance to woo the devel
oping nations into forming political alignments, most of the develop
ing nations have been unwilling to become associated with either west
or east,1

While these nations have been happy to receive aid and

eager to obtain more, they have not felt compelled to accept the lead
ership of either east or west in international affairs.2

David Kay3

summarizes the developing nations' view of the ideological conflict in
the international arena whose manifestations they have had to encounter
in their quest for development.
Ideological issues have found the new nations, in general,
fragmented, Moved by twin beliefs in the essential irrel
evancy of the east-west conflict to their own goals and the
dangers it poses to achieving these goals, many new nations
have consistently abstained on east-west issues,
1Kay, David, The New Nations in the United Nations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970 ) , p. 11.0.
2

Geiger,
.
p.

7•

3 Kay, p. 144.

The significant fact which emerges is that the developing nations,
no less than the developed nations, possess their own distinctive set
of priorities and that they view all issues in terms of these priori
ties.

Economic development and political self-assertion are primary

goals.

In their view, the United Nations is the prime instrument for

the attainment of these goals,

Its commitment to international cooper

ation in solving problems of an economic, social or political character
and in promoting higher standards of living provides a broad umbrella
of legitimacy for the pursuit of their goals.

From their perspective,

the United Nations is both the best available platform for advancing
their claim to a greater share of the world's resources and the most
suitable operational instrument for carrying out this redistribution.1
This provides the opportunity to participate eq_ually with the developed
nations in the making of decisions which affect their development.
It is on the basis of these perceptions that the campaign for a
United Nations Capital Development Fund was launched,
1ibid,, p, 182.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
It is clear that both developed and developing worlds generally
feel that people in the poor countries should be better off,

Both

profess to be on the same side, marching under the same banner, toward
the same goal,

Disagreement centers around the appropriate means for

the achievement of this goal, Each side's vision of the appropriate
means is determined by perceptions of its own national interests and
how these can best be served,
Nowhere has this disagreement been more pronounced than in the
case of the Capital Development Fund,

Indeed, it is this basic con

flict of interests which has determined the fate of the Fund,

Its

creation was prompted by a grave need in the developing nations for
capital to implement development projects and by a dissatisfaction
with the World Bank both because of the terms of its lending and
because of the dominant position of the developed countries,

The pur

pose of the Fund was to assist developing countries by means of grants
and loans, particularly long-term loans made free of interest or at
low interest rates,

Contributions to the Fund, its supporters held,

should come from the advanced states,

The position of the developed

nations has been and continues to be absolute rejection of the Fund,
Several arguments have been presented in support of this position,
e,g,, additional financial costs such a fund would entail; possible
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duplication of capital exporting indsitutions; and balance of payments
problems,

More likely reasons for the rejection of the project were

the aversion of many advanced countries to provide grants of capital
rather than loans through established institutions, because such a
Fund was not in harmony with their basic political and economic foreign
policies, and their lack of control over funds granted through an
agency such as the Capital Development Fund,1

In spite of this

opposition, the developing nations continued their campaign which cul
minated in the

1966 establishment of the United Nations Capital Devel

opment Fund by the General Assembly,
T_he political victory won by the creation of the Capital Develop
ment Fund proved to be a hollow one,

For, the success of any develop

ment fund requires more than the acquiescence of the developed nations;
it requires their active support in terms of large financial commit
ments,

The developed nations have not only adamantly refused to give

financial support to the Fund, but most have not regarded it as a valid
and legitimate international institution,

This has been shown by

their continuous boycott of all pledging conferences for the Fund,
The meager amount of capital which the Fund does possess has been con
tributed almost exclusively by the developing nations,
failed to fulfill the purpose for which it was created,

It has thus
In essence,

it suffers from a lack of legitimacy in a de jure sense although it
does exist in a de facto sense,
1Plano and Riggs, p. 432,
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Why Is UNCDF a Failure?
The conclusion is inescapable that the failure of the Fund stems
from an inability on the part of the developed and the developing
nations to reconcile their differences in perspectives,

What the devel

oping nations envisaged in their bold advocacy of a Capital Development
Fund goes beyond the need for additional capital.
dual function:

It was to serve a

economic - in that it would provide sizable amounts of

scarce capital; political - in that developed and developing nations
would share equally the powers of decision making,

Indeed, what is

implied in the whole notion of a Capital Development Fund is a change
in the status quo, i,e,, freeing capital assistance from political
entanglements,

In essence, the conflict over the Fund therefore raises

the basic question:

Are the developed countries sincere in their

professions of support for developmental programs?

Would the develop

mental success of one hundred poor countries be congruent with the
national interest objectives of the rich?

To the poor countries, the

Fund is a reflection of the belief that their political and economic
iterests can best be served by concerted action on the part of the
world community within the United Nations framework and by lessened
direct economic dependence on the competitive foreign policies of the
developed world,

To the extent that the Fund does eliminate national

interest considerations from the aid-giving process, it removes the
raison d'etre for additional assistance in the perspective of the rich
nations,

In their view, the political motives, which in this case

are the predominant ones for granting concessions, are too unaertain
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to merit larger investments; economic aims are clearly subsidiary, not
justifying substantial concessions; and humanitarian goals are presum
ably met by the present level of assistance,

The crucial factor here

is the refusal of both sides to compromise on their objectives,
side considers its position to be a perfectly reasonable one,

Each
Thus

the same unity and determination which marked the developing nations'
campaign for the Fund also marked the developed nations' opposition to
it,

In essence, both sides are motivated by national self-interest

considerations which are not harmonious,
My Conclusions
The Capital Development Fund campaign has had several notable
effects on relations between the rich and poor nations,

Whereas its

supporters had hoped that the Fund would serve to narrow the ideological,
the political, and the economic gap between these nations, it has done
quite the contrary,

The fact that it is the developing nations which

are contributing almost exclusively to a fund designed to provide them
with additional capital is self-defeating,

This is an uneconomic

redistribution of resources and a diversion of funds which might other
wise be used to implement development plans,

In short, the economic

gap between the rich and the poor, developed and developing, is grow
ing,

The attitude of the developed nations has provided additional

evidence for the accusation that their primary concern is the defense
of their own ideological and political interests.

It has also confirmed,

in the minds of the leaders of developing nations, the much heralded
accusation that the primary motive for assistance is the furtherance

10 1
of these ideological and political goals,

Soviet-American contribution

to the Fund might have dispelled the belief that aid is simply an
extension of the East-West struggle,

Instead, their opposition has

been interpreted as a deliberate attempt to retain the current world
power balance and to perpetuate the economic dependence of the poor
countries,

A psychological gap between rich and poor has thus been

widened which makes 'more difficult the establishment of mutual trust,
A major effect of the Fund's campaign was the development of a
spirit of unity among the third world nations,

This has been demon

strated notably by the growing solidarity of voting behavior in the
General Assembly,

This campaign was the first major issue and contin

ued to be a rallying point for the poor countries in their world organ
ization posture toward the rich nations,

Despite the very considerable

differences which exist among the developing nations and their lack
of an economic doctrine to universalize their claim to economic development, they have shown great unity in the struggle to achieve the
means for their development,

David Kay 1 points out that whereas the

newly independent nations have tended to be fragmented on ideological
issues, they have been able to form a united front on questions con
cerning economic development and colonialism,

It is their conviction

that only through working as a cohesive voting bloc in the General
Assembly can they bring pressure to bear upon the industrialized states
and produce changes in the international arena,

They realize that

political muscle is needed to secure economic concessions,

1 Kay, p. 90,
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A related impact of the campaign and a direct consequence of this
new found sense of unity was the creation of a cohesive voting bloc of
developing nations which came to be known as the "Caucus of the
Seventy-Seven." This group caucused, petitioned and voted as a bloc
during the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
1
(UNCTAD).

Currently, it is approaching one hundred participants,

well over the two-thirds needed for adopting "important question
measures."
tion

The subsequent establishment, by General Assembly Resolu

1995 (XIX), December JO, 1964, of UNCTAD as a permanent U. N.

organization over predominant Northern objections is testimony enough
of the South's growing solidarity and voting control.

This sense of

unity has provided a forum (UNCTAD) in which the developing nations
can codify their objections to the existing system, exercise constant
pressure for concessions, and drive successful bargains with the North.
Though its main purpose is to serve as a center for harmonizing trade
and development policies, and as a means for the developing states to
exert pressures upon the developed states to relent in their restric
tionist trade policies, UNCTAD has, through its many resolutions and
acts, solicited additional assistance for the developing nations,

On

the question of the Capital Development Fund, UNCTAD's majority has
entered a strong plea for a change in the attitude of the developed
nations.

In short, UNCTAD is a forum which examines systematically

the problems of the developing nations and seeks remedies for them,
As such, it voices the aspirations of the developing nations as a
1
Trade, A i. d , and Deve1 opment, p. 76 •
P incus,
·
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collectivity,

Like the UNCDF, UNCTAD's attempt to restyle world trade

patterns in a way that would enable the poor countries to earn increas
ing amounts of capital conflicted with the rich countries' basic polit
ical and economic interests,

The UNCTAD experience closely resembles

that of UNCDF in that, while both were political victories in that the
Caucus of the Seventy-Seven established them despite the opposition of
the developed states, the latter's lack of sympathy with their basic
objectives has vitiated their purpose and effectiveness,
While the Fund's campaign has served to unify the developing
nations, it has also tended to weaken the world community approach,
The rigid positions taken by both sides, i.e., the absolute refusal of
the rich countries to underwrite with capital an institution created
by more than two-thirds of the United Nations members, and the refusal
of the developing nations to compromise on the basic principles which
guide the Fund, have added a considerable degree of polarization
between rich and poor, developed and developing, north and south,

Dif

ferences over the issues of aid and development have tended to increase
with the rich becoming extremely resentful of pressures exerted by the
poor nations.

It is precisely because the developing nations see their

forward momentum threatened by bleak aid prospects that they feel a
growing sense of frustration,

They feel that their problems are

ignored and they see no sign of real commitment to help alleviate their
tremendous problems of poverty, social change, and economic develop
ment.1
1

Pearson, Lester B, (Chairman), Re t) ort of the Commission on
I�ter.�ational Devel��eni (New York: Praeger Publishers, 19D9, p. 8.
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If the Capital Development Fund was a test of the degree of com
mitment and willingness on the part of the world community to assume
collective responsibility for development, then the advanced nations
have failed,

As Pincus 2 points out:

Northern consensus on development is "progressive" in
appearance and coincides thereby with Southern aims,
But aspirations are cheap, Everyone longs for the almost
perfect state, What price in terms of acceptance of
change is he willing to pay to reach it? If there is
nothing to lose people may be willing to support radical
change, As the risks of loss increase relative to antici
pated benefits, the subjective willingness to "pay" for
changes declines , , , , The developed nations want to
see the developing nations bask in material comforts but
they are not willing to pay a high price for the pros
pect, Therefore, they propose, as is fair enough that
internal reforms set the pace,
The establishment of the Fund is, in a sense, a translation of
national socialist principles to the world community,

For the same

reason that the rich within a society are hesitant to support ideas of
socialism, i,e,, greater diffusion of wealth and power, the rich
nations, including the Socialist bloc as well as the Capitalist states,
reject the idea inherent in the Fund of a greater sharing of world
resources through the distribution of capital,
the developed nations

Whereas governments of

have implemented programs to deal with internal

poverty, the same zeal has not characterized the fight against world
poverty,

Neither the United States nor any other developed nation has

yet accepted an obligation to the poor nations in any way analogous to
that which they accept toward the individual poor and the poorer states
and regions within their own nations,

Senator Fulbright

1P.incus, Trade, Aid and DaveloEment, pp. 349, 350,
2

Fulbright,p, 223,

2

states:
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The obligation of the rich to help the poor is recog
nized by every major religion, by every formal system
of ethics, and by individuals who claim no moral code
beyond a simple sense of human decency, Unless national
borders are regarded as the limits of human loyalty and
compassion as well as of political authority, the obli
gation of the rich to the poor clearly encompasses an
obligation on the part of the rich nations to poor
nations, Indeed it is no more than common sense to
recognize that among as within them, the·security of the
rich is best assured by providing hope and opportunity
for the poor,
If development is to be dealt with by concerted action on the part
of the world community, all nations must take seriously the q_uestion
of world distribution of income between countries and not only within
them,

This means not only moving toward some acceptable pattern of

world income distribution, but also recognizing that interdependence
in the world economy carries the same implications as interdependence
within the national economy, namely that transfer from the rich to the
poor are not charitable gifts to be given when the mood of generosity
or pity runs high or when there are political favors to gain, but
that they are just and obligatory payments, as a logical and coherent
part of an interdependent world economy being managed (however visionary this may seem) in the interests of all,

1

The role of the United Nations is of great significance in the
building of a world community and the struggle for development.

It

has, since its inception, been heavily engaged in relieving human misery
in the aftermath of war, in raising levels of nutrition and literacy,
and in protecting human and political rights,

The process of

1J olly, R., "Aid Relationship: Reflections on the Pearson Report,"
Journal of International Affai��, Vol, 24, No, 2, 1970, p. 177,
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modernization and development is by definition a process of nation
building and institution-building in which the United Nations can play
a crucial role,

Indeed, the developing nations believe that the U, N.

should play a paramount role in development, particularly as a channel
for foreign assistance,

This was a prime motive for the UNCDF campaign,

The developed nations have been unwilling to delegate so much authority
to an organization in which they are being greatly outnumbered by a
solid bloc of newly independent states.

They are content to let the

organization play a static rather than a dynamic role in the sphere
of capital assistance.

The failure of the UNCDF has done just that:

weakened the United Nations and decreased its potential role in devel
opment.

The ideal of building a world community has suffered a setback

by the emphasis that both sides have placed on their national interest
considerations in their refusal to reach a consensus in support of
the Fund,

The developed nations' rejection of the Fund by their fail

ure to provide working capital has only served to divide the U, N. into
more warring factions,
The rich and powerful states may ultimately come to distinguish
between short-term national interests aimed at gaining momentary advan
tage over others, and the long-range national interest built on a solid
foundation of cooperation, common interest, and world community,

A

successful developmental program, such as that envisioned by the crea
tion of UNCDF, could serve to move the nations of the world toward
realization of the latter,

It has not been possible in the contempor

ary world, however, for long-range community interests to triumph over
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the narrow parochial interests to produce a situation of harmonious
and trustful collaboration between North and South,

It would be futile

to try to wish into existence a world in which the forces of extreme
nationalism yield constantly to the larger interests of mankind,

But

these nations must focus intensely on the common interests that exist
or might be brought into being, and study attentively the possibili
ties offered by the only political institution joining the two-the
U, N,-for making those interests concrete and giving them form and
operative meaning,

There is room to sharpen the utility of the United

Nations as an agency for lessening-and, in this sense, civilizing
the virulence of self-centered nationalism by using it to give greater
encouragement to the parallel trend toward consolidation and inte
gration, and by international activities, programs, and institutions
that transcend the concerns of individual nations and reflect a com

1
mon interest, however limited to start with,

Major responsibility

for the planning and allocation of aid could be shifted from national
governments, against which there may be built-in suspicions and preju
dices, to the international organizations, particularly those under
the aegis of the United Nations,

But the United Nations derives its

strength from its members; it can only be as active as they allow it
to be,

Probably nothing is more important in determining the role of

the United Nations on the world political stage than the nature of the
U, N, image that leading statesmen hold in their minds,

Where these

images conflict, as between North and South, the organization's growth

1 Bloomfield, p. 244.
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will be stifled.

When international organizations postulate a con

sensus where none exists, they risk perpetual failure and disillusion
ment; but where there is a legitimate prospect of a genuine community
of interests around a specific-rather than an abstract-need such as
development, there is every cause to move, and move vigorously.

What

ever its inadequacies, U. N. programs such as UNDP and UNCDF are
politically representative of the developing countries• interest in a
way which the allocation of votes in the World Bank and the IMF makes
virtually impossible.

In addition, they promote a more rational dis

tribution of assistance and the establishment of acceptable criteria
for allocation and for objective monitoring of performance.1
What for the Future?

It would be an illusion to believe that all funds for aid could
be wisely put into one great pool, administered on entirely scientific
principles by the U. N., the World Bank or some new organization for
world development,

Man's every activity is increasingly becoming

international, but his loyalties remain parochial-confined to national
borders.

The UNCDF campaign clearly demonstrates this.

world has made one point absolutely clear:

The developed

that it has decided what

degree of "cooperation" serves its political interests and its sense
of justice, in the light of other goals.

This can be seen in the

creation of the Special Fund in 1958 and the International Development
Association in

1960 as efforts by the developed states to mitigate the

1Pearson, Lester, The Crisis of Development (New York:
Publishers, 1970), p. 74.

Praeger
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UN:DF demands while retaining the key features of voting control.
Beyond this point, barring dramatic political changes, the South can
not look to increases in Northern largesse,

And, as the great powers

tend to reach a stabilized global level of concessions, the Southern
task of obtaining capital becomes harder.

As East and West move

toward detente the profitability of cold war bi-polar badminton will
decline.

How will the developing states, already deep in debt, secure

the needed capital?

What new initiatives will be attempted in their

desperate effort to secure capital?
It must be admitted that definite answers to such questions are
elusive,

One can only speculate on the basis of current attitudes,

It is not likely that the attitude of the developed nations towards
the UNCDF or any institution of similar nature, will change.

In the

light of this some of the developing nations have suggested that its
1
meager resources be returned to the respective contributors.

But in

all likelihood this paupers' fund will continue to exist only as a
symbol of their aspirations,

Any increase in concessions from the

North will have to come from changing perceptions of the issues,
probably as catalyzed by new trends in political relations; or, in the
long run, by the vast prospective growth of Northern income.

The

developed nations would have to learn to see development as it is,
and not as they would like it to be,

From such an altered point of

view comes the realization that they can only exert an influence over
the direction of economic development, if they use the power in con
sonance with the drift of events and not agai�st it.
1 u. N. Offici�l Documents, UNDP 14th Session, January 1973, Doc.
DP/sn. 337. See statemEm t of delegate from Philippines, p. 146.
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Since their stated goal of a large-scale U. N. donor agency is
not in the cards right now, the developing nations will have to take
advantage of those institutions already established in the field of
capital assistance, i.e., IBRD...,IDA,

Meanwhile it is in the South's

interest to use its new majorities in the United Nations to exert
realistic and unremitting pressures on the North,

For those develop

ing nations that have maintained close cultural and economic ties
with former colonial powers, this could serve as an avenue for addi
tional resources until there is a rededication of Northern energies
for a common world prosperity.

The UNCDF remains important not for

its contributions to ending world poverty, since they are meager
indeed, but for contributing to a better understanding of the basic
conflicts of perspectives and policies between the rich and the poor
nations of the world in the contemporary state system,
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